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I use two datasets to test the relation between trading volume, the heterogeneity of beliefs 
and the heterogeneity of belief revisions.  The first dataset allows me to construct two groups 
that proxy for ‘holders’ and ‘non-holders’ of a traded asset.  This construct allows me to test the 
relation between changes in trading volume and changes in the dispersion of beliefs both within 
and across these two groups.  I examine changes in within- and across-group dispersion 
separately and simultaneously.  The second dataset allows me to examine belief revisions more 
closely by analyzing only those prior and posterior beliefs surrounding an information event.  I 
examine the impact of specific belief revision phenomena on trading volume. 
 My results provide evidence that without regard to specific information events, trading 
volume is positively related to any change in within-group or across-group dispersion whether 
this dispersion is measured separately or simultaneously.  Second, I provide evidence that this 
result holds regardless of the specific characteristics of the belief revisions.  This result provides 
further definition to the findings of Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Bamber, Barron and Stober 
(1999).  Finally, my results suggest that extreme belief revisions such that investors with higher 
valuations subsequently hold lower valuations (‘flips’) have a highly positive and significant 
relation to changes in market liquidity. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
As noted by Kandel and Pearson (1995), it is widely accepted in the economics, finance 
(and accounting) literature that investors trade because of their differing assessments of security 
value (heterogeneity of agents).  Much work has been done to try to uncover the nature of those 
differences and their impact on trading.  Commonly, these differences are related to preferences 
(risk aversion), priors (endowments of wealth, intellect, etc.) and information.  Researchers as far 
back as Beaver (1968) have focused on differences in prior beliefs and information.   
I examine the effect of investor belief revisions on market liquidity.  There are many 
reasons why we need a clear understanding of market liquidity and in particular, its causes.  
Primarily, it is important to gain a better understanding of the impact of liquidity traders, to 
determine the level (if any) of information content in market liquidity and to understand the 
effects of market design on market liquidity.   Several studies such as Morse ((1980), 
(1981)) and Bamber ((1986), (1987)) have documented the impact of investor belief revisions on 
asset prices, but this paper describes the resulting change in trading volume.  Similarly previous 
researchers have also investigated the information content of market liquidity.  A primary focus 
has been whether or not we can make inferences regarding the level of investor consensus based 
on the volume reaction to information events.  Over time, two schools of thought have emerged.  
The first school includes Beaver (1968) who argues that a volume response to an information 
event provides evidence that there is a lack of consensus regarding the implications of the news.  
Thus, the absence of a volume response suggests that there is total consensus among investors.  
Stated alternatively, this school of thought contends that there is a positive relation between 
volume and belief heterogeneity.  Karpoff (1986) derives a model wherein trading is caused by 
investor heterogeneity with respect to their prior beliefs and the way in which they revise those 
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beliefs.  This model is supported empirically by both Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (1991) and Barron 
(1995).  Neither of these empirical studies, however, use data relative to specific information 
events.  Instead, they test changes in volume and investor beliefs over time as information is 
continuously revealed to the market.  In a slightly different type of study, Bamber and Cheon 
(1995) examine the differing magnitudes of volume (and price) responses to new information.  
They find that volume increases as the degree of heterogeneity in belief revisions increases.  
Kandel and Pearson (1995) focus on the common trading model assumption of homogeneous 
belief revisions.  They provide a theory supported by empirical evidence showing that investors 
do not interpret new information identically.  Empirically, they find a positive relation between 
volume and specific cases of these heterogeneous belief revisions.  Bamber, Barron and Stober 
(1999) provide additional support for Kandel and Pearson (1995). 
In the alternative school of thought, Verrecchia (1981) argues that it is not justifiable to 
infer investor consensus from the absence of a volume response to new information.  Ziebart 
(1990) supports this argument with (weak) evidence that volume, the degree of investor 
consensus and the magnitude of belief revisions are all positively related.  My model and 
empirical results support Verrecchia (1981) and Ziebart (1990).  I find that volume increases as 
the level of consensus across investors increases.  Also, the greater the degree of homogeneity in 







1.1. Theoretical Model 
 
I develop a theoretical model that seeks to explain market liquidity at a given point in time 
as well as changes in market liquidity from one period to the next.  Assuming a two-period 
economy with no transactions costs or liquidity traders, I show that at a given point in time, 
market liquidity is a function of the dispersion of investor beliefs relative to a central region of 
consensus.  Given this foundation, I also show that from one period to the next, changes in 
market liquidity are a function of the change in dispersion, prior belief heterogeneity and belief 
revision heterogeneity. 
 
1.2. Empirical Data and Methodology 
 
I use two datasets, both based on analyst forecasts, to empirically test my predictions.  In 
the first dataset, I use a sample of 80,270 analyst forecasts for 4,473 firms from 1990 to 2002.  I 
categorize each forecast as a proxy for a ‘holder’ or a ‘non-holder’ based on a comparison of 
each forecast to the mean value of all forecasts made in the same month for the same firm.  I 
classify forecasts greater than the mean as ‘holders’ because these analysts represent investors 
with higher than average expectations of the firm and are therefore likely to own or ‘hold’ units 
of the traded asset.  I classify forecasts less than or equal to the mean as ‘non-holders’ because 
these analysts represent investors with average or less than average expectations of the firm and 
are therefore not likely to own or ‘hold’ units of the traded asset.  Using this dataset, I test for a 
relation between market liquidity and belief dispersion.  I examine both within-group and across-
group dispersion. 
 4
In the second dataset, I use a sample of 5,640 observations for 1,364 firms from 1993 to 
2002.  Each observation corresponds with one earnings announcement.  For each earnings 
announcement, I calculate the mean value of all forecasts for that firm in the 45 days prior to the 
earnings announcement and the mean value of all forecasts for that firm in the 30 days following 
the earnings announcement.  To be included in the sample, a firm must have volume and return 
data available on CRSP and at least two analysts making annual forecasts in the 45 days prior to 
the earnings announcement and the same analysts must make a revised forecast in the 30 days 
following the earnings announcement.  Once I identify all firms that meet these criteria, I search 
for analysts that make more than one forecast for the same firm in the pre-announcement period, 
the post-announcement period or both periods.  In these cases, I eliminate all but the forecasts 
closest to the announcement date.  I then calculate the grand mean of all of the forecasts.  Based 
on this mean, I calculate the mean of all forecasts above the grand mean and all forecasts below 
the grand mean.  Finally, I classify each observation in three ways:  1) divergent, convergent or 
constant, 2) consistent or inconsistent and 3) ‘flip’ or ‘no flip’.  I define a divergent (convergent) 
analyst pair as one where the absolute difference in the post-announcement forecasts is greater 
(less) than the absolute difference in the pre-announcement forecasts.  If the absolute difference 
in the post-announcement forecasts is equal to the absolute difference in the pre-announcement 
forecasts, I classify this analyst pair as ‘constant’.  I define a consistent analyst pair as one where 
both analysts revise in the same direction (either both upward or both downward).  In contrast, I 
classify analyst pairs where one analyst revises his/her forecast upward while the other analyst 
revises his/her forecast downward as ‘inconsistent’.  I define a flip as an analyst pair where the 
analyst with the higher pre-announcement forecast has the lower post-announcement forecast.  In 
cases where the analyst with the higher pre-announcement forecast also has the higher post-
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announcement forecast, I classify the analyst pair as a ‘no flip’.  Also, if either the pre-
announcement forecasts or the post-announcement forecasts are equal, I categorize the analyst 
pair as a ‘no flip’.  Using this dataset, I test for a relation between the change in volume over the 
three day period (-1,+1) relative the quarterly announcement date and these characteristics of the 
analyst pairings. 
 
1.3. Main Findings and Conclusions 
 
My empirical results support my theoretical predictions.  Dispersion and changes in 
dispersion alone do not fully explain market liquidity.  I find that when analyzing ‘holders’ 
versus ‘non-holders’ any change in within-group or across-group dispersion is positively related 
to market liquidity.  Similarly, after classifying forecast revisions according to the additional 
characteristics, I find that the convergence of beliefs and the homogeneity of belief revisions are 
significantly related to market liquidity.  One interesting finding is that after separating divergent 
forecast revision pairs from ‘flipping’ revision pairs there is a significant relation between the 
‘flips’ and market liquidity.  That is, as investors ‘flip’ their beliefs, market liquidity increases.  
Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Bamber, Barron and Stober (1999) included these pairs with 
divergent pairs in their analysis, so such a distinction could not be made.  Thus, my main result is 
that changes in market liquidity can be explained by 1)  changes in dispersion both within and 







Chapter Two reviews the theoretical and empirical literature to-date regarding market 
liquidity.  Chapter Three describes the model, the data I use to test it and the empirical tests I 
perform.  Chapter Four presents the results of the univariate and multivariate analysis.  Chapter 
Five summarizes and concludes. 
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Chapter 2:  Review of the Literature 
 
 
 Trading volume has been examined in the academic literature in a variety of 
contexts.  My concern is with the relation between trading volume and information.  I 
consider investor’s beliefs before and after information is made public and how investor 
interpretations of this information impacts trading volume.  Many previous studies have 
addressed similar issues with mixed results.  I focus my investigation on the equity 
markets; however researchers have made significant contributions to the existing 
literature by examining trading volume in other markets such as the bond market, foreign 
exchange market, futures markets and options markets. 
2.1. Theory 
 
 A considerable number of theoretical papers exist that attempt to explain what 
causes or influences trading volume.  Some of these papers focus only on trading volume 
while others model changes in trading volume in conjunction with changes in price or 
other factors.   
2.1.1. Information Asymmetry 
 
A number of studies consider environments where information asymmetry exists 
among traders.  In general, these studies have shown both theoretically and empirically 
that traders are able to earn positive abnormal returns by trading on private (insider) 
information.  Also, many of these studies show that investors must rely on specific 
patterns or levels of trading volume in order to realize these returns. In Morse’s (1980) 
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model, this asymmetric information environment is a result of unequal costs of obtaining 
and processing information and causes trade. 
The majority of the current theory suggests that asymmetric information results in 
an increase in trading volume.  Kyle’s (1985) single-period model with one informed 
trader, one uninformed trader and a market maker shows how informed traders ‘hide’ 
behind uninformed traders and earn positive abnormal returns at the expense of 
uninformed traders.  Trading strategically, the informed traders gradually release their 
private information to the market through their order quantity decisions.  Later theories 
such as Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) extend the Kyle model to one in which 
multiple informed traders compete for profits and find that the release of information 
occurs more quickly.   
Foster and Viswanathan (1993a) develop a one-period model of market making 
with informed traders and show three key results.  First, the variance of prices and 
expected trading volume depend on the ‘surprise’ component contained in public 
information released at the start of trading.  Second, if the decision to become informed is 
endogenous, the decision rules of the market maker (relative to price) and the insider 
(relative to quantity) depend on the level of surprise in the public information.  Finally, 
when expanded to multiple periods with multiple insiders who have long-lived private 
information, informed traders’ profits (which are present in the one-period model) 
disappear.  The key difference between this model and the Kyle (1985) model is that 
volume and volatility are allowed to depend upon the public information that is revealed.  
That is, if the public information is not complete but is close to investors’ expectations, 
this information has little impact on volume and volatility.  However, if the public 
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information differs substantially from investors’ expectations, volume and volatility 
increase. 
Wang (1994) models stock trading by investors with heterogeneous prior 
information who trade for informational and non-informational motives.  Wang shows 
that volume is positively correlated with absolute changes in prices and dividends and 
that the relation between trading volume and stock returns differs depending on the 
trader’s motive.  Further, without asymmetric information, abnormal trading volume is 
not present. 
In an opposite approach, other studies show that trading volume is used by traders 
to estimate the level of private information in the market and therefore, set their own 
trading strategy accordingly.   Kim and Verrecchia (2001) develop a model in which the 
firm’s returns depend on trading volume when the firm defers disclosure because market 
makers use volume to draw inferences about better-informed investors’ private 
information on firm value.  Therefore, firms that disclose more would find that trading 
volume has less explanatory power over the firm’s stock returns.  Suominen (2001) 
develops a model in which the rates of public and private information arrival are random 
and the flow of private information, in particular, depends on its availability which also 
changes randomly over time.  Traders, however, estimate the availability of private 
information based on past period trading volume and trade accordingly. 
2.1.2. Volume Response to Public Announcements 
 
Kim and Verrecchia (1991a) assert that differences in the precision of traders’ 
prior information cause them to make different belief revisions triggering positive 
abnormal trading volume.  They provide a theory for how price and volume reactions to a 
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public announcement are related to each other, to the announcement and to the traders’ 
beliefs at the time of the announcement.  Their main result is that trading volume is 
proportional to both the absolute price change and a measure of differential precision 




Volume r s s di P P = − − 
 ∫  (2.1) 
 
where:  ri = trader i’s risk tolerance, si = the precision of trader i’s private information, s = 
average precision and 2 1P P−  is the absolute change in price (P). 
Then, in this equation, the term 1
2 i i
r s s di − 
 ∫  is the measure of differential precision 
across traders.  The measure of differential precision across traders is the weighted 
average of the absolute deviations of the precision of traders’ private information (si) 
from the average precision (s) and weighted by risk tolerance (ri). Also, they show that 
expected volume and variance of price change are increasing functions of the precision of 
the announced information and decreasing functions of the amount of preannouncement 
public and private information. 
Harris and Raviv (1993) assume that investors have homogeneous prior beliefs 
and receive the same information, but have different interpretations of that information.  
Their model shows volume is positively autocorrelated and that absolute price changes 
and absolute changes in the mean earnings forecasts and volume are positively correlated.  
Further, they show that, in a speculative market, if investors overestimate (underestimate) 
the precision of their information, then subsequent price changes will be negatively 
(positively) serially correlated.  
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Kim and Verrecchia (1994), theorize that the fact that some traders are able to 
make better decisions than others based on the same information leads to information 
asymmetry and positive abnormal trading volume despite a reduction in liquidity.  They 
measure liquidity as 1
λ
where λ is the inverse of Kyle’s (1985) market depth parameter.  
The Kim and Verrecchia (1994) measure, 1
λ
, is the order flow necessary to induce prices 
to rise or fall by one dollar.  Therefore, a small λ implies that a trader can buy or sell a 
large amount of stock for a price that is, on average, close to the current market price.  
Therefore, the market is said to be liquid.  In contrast, a large λ implies an illiquid 
market.  Finally, given the boundary condition 0λ ≥ , if 0λ = , the market is infinitely 
deep.   
Similarly, other studies conjecture that the trading volume reaction to public 
announcements is related to the informativeness of the announcement.  Holthausen and 
Verrecchia (1990) argue that this ‘informedness effect’ and a ‘consensus effect’ (which 
measures the extent of agreement among agents at the time of an information release) 
occur simultaneously and affect both trading volume and price changes. 
Karpoff (1986) theorizes that both pre- and post- announcement belief dispersion 
are related to trading volume.  Karpoff models trading volume based on several 
assumptions.  First, market participants revise their beliefs after new information is 
revealed.  Second, trade occurs when buyers and sellers encounter one another at random. 
Third, short-selling is not allowed.  The model explains information-related trading as a 
function of the market participants’ prior beliefs as well as their interpretations of new 
information.   
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The Karpoff model considers homogeneous priors with differential interpretations 
and heterogeneous priors with homogeneous interpretations of information.  Kandel and 
Pearson (1995), however, argue theoretically and empirically that homogeneous 
interpretations of information are unrealistic. Kim and Verrecchia (2002) wage strong 
criticism against models that consider only pre-announcement or event period 
information.  They argue that a model (such as theirs) that incorporates both types of 
information is more realistic because it is rare for only one of these types of information 
(pre-announcement or event-period) to exist.  Thus, in their model, volume (which they 
note is caused by demand change) is related to price change at the time of an earnings 
announcement.  However, trading volume occurs even in the absence of price change.   
2.1.3. Stock Price, Stock Returns and Volatility 
 
Karpoff (1987) reviews the existing literature (at the time of the article) that 
relates trading volume to price changes.  One of the key contributions that this paper 
makes to the literature is that it points out the empirical evidence suggesting that volume 
is positively related to the magnitude of the price change. 
Llorente, Michaely, Saar and Wang (2002) also examine the relation between 
return and volume of individual stocks.  They note that investors trade for three reasons:  
liquidity, hedging (portfolio rebalancing) or speculation.  They develop a model that 
suggests that hedging activity is marked by price reversals while speculative activity is 





2.2 Empirical Evidence 
 
2.2.1. Information Asymmetry 
 
Others have specifically examined cases of insider trading and found mixed 
results.  Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992) examine the average abnormal returns, average 
abnormal trading volume and reported insider trading of corporate control target firms 
prior to public announcement of the initiation of corporate control transactions.  They 
find no evidence of abnormal trading volume until the first public announcement 
regarding the transaction.  Cornell and Sirri (1992), however, use the case of Anheuser-
Busch’s 1982 tender offer for Campbell Taggart to analyze insider trading and find that 
insider trading had a significant impact on the price of the target and overall trading 
volume rose. 
Lang, Litzenberger and Madrigal (1992) provide evidence that the dispersion of 
private information across traders has an impact on trading volume, but not on price.   
To reduce the prevalence of asymmetric information in securities markets, the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) promotes public disclosure of information and 
takes action against those who attempt to profit from trading on inside information.  Ro 
(1981) examines a specific SEC mandate, Accounting Series Release No. 190 (ASR 
190), which requires footnote disclosure of replacement cost accounting information by 
certain firms.  Ro evaluates the impact of this mandate on transaction volumes of 
common stock for companies having to comply with this disclosure rule.  Ro finds no 
evidence of a relation between the announcement of ASR 190 and trading volume either 
through increased total volume or a difference in volume between those firms affected by 
the ruling and those unaffected by the ruling. 
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2.2.2. Volume Response to Public Announcements 
 
 When examining market activity (typically volume and price movement or 
returns) in response to public news announcements, researchers have considered a 
number of different types of news such as dividend information, earnings 
announcements, macroeconomic announcements, news announcements from specific 
sources, and general information flow.  Market efficiency suggests that the price and 
volume response to such announcements should be immediate.  Current evidence 
generally supports market efficiency.  Researchers have also considered the implications 
for market consensus based on volume response to public announcements considering 
that investors simply do not have homogenous interpretations of public announcements.   
2.2.2.1. Dividends 
 
With respect to dividend policy announcements, Richardson, Sefcik and 
Thompson (1986b) investigate the impact of changes in dividend policy on trading 
volume assuming that such changes have a clientele effect in that the firm’s shareholder 
clientele changes as shareholders have specific dividend preferences due to their personal 
income tax implications.  They find that upon announcing their first cash dividend, 
sample firms enjoy increased volume and value possibly due to the perception that the 
announcement signals stable future earnings. 
2.2.2.2. Earnings Announcements 
 
Most studies examining the relation between trading volume and public 
announcements examine the market activity surrounding earnings announcements.  
Beaver’s (1968) early study of the information content of earnings announcements 
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examines investor reactions to earnings announcements with respect to volume and price.  
Using a sample of annual earnings announcements released by 143 firms during the years 
1961 through 1965, Beaver finds that both volume and price changes support the 
contention that earnings announcements are informative.  Further, he argues that a 
simultaneous change in volume and price indicates that the announcement affects the 
beliefs of the market as a whole.   The volume response appears to increase with the 
amount of surprise in the announcement and the size of the firm.  For a sample of firms 
chosen at random from the Value Line Investment Survey, Bamber (1986) finds a 
positive relation between volume and the magnitude of surprises and a negative relation 
between volume and size.  Later, Bamber (1987) finds that both the magnitude and the 
duration of the trading volume reaction to quarterly earnings announcements are 
increasing functions of unexpected earnings and decreasing functions of firm size.  
Generally, there is evidence that investor heterogeneity – or differences in beliefs 
- impacts trading volume.  This heterogeneity can be either prior to the announcement, 
after the announcement or both.     
Atiase and Bamber (1994) support Kim and Verrecchia’s (1991a) theory that 
trading volume is proportional to both the absolute price change and a measure of 
differential precision across traders.   
Ziebart (1990) studies a sample of 611 earnings announcements of 90 NYSE-
listed firms.  He finds that abnormal trading volume is related to the change in the level 
of investor consensus (proxied by dispersion in analysts’ forecasts) and the absolute value 
of the percentage change in the consensus forecast as opposed to the level of prior 
information.  That is, trading volume reactions to earnings announcement reflect the 
 
 16
surprise in the announcement and the level of consensus of investors’ belief revisions.  
Similarly, Bamber and Cheon (1995) use a sample of price and volume reactions to 8,180 
quarterly earnings announcements from 1986 to 1989 by 1,079 firms to compare these 
volume reactions to their accompanying price reactions.  They find that trading volume is 
likely to be high relative to price reaction when an earnings announcement generates 
differential belief revisions among investors (as demonstrated by high trading volume), 
but a limited aggregate market belief revision (as demonstrated by small price change).   
Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (1991) provide empirical evidence in support of 
Karpoff’s (1986) theory that trading volume is positively related to the degree of 
differing beliefs.  Using a sample of 420 firms with a December 31st fiscal year-end, no 
stock splits or stock dividends during the sample period and at least three analysts 
reporting forecasts in each sample month they collect analyst forecasts and monthly 
trading volume from 1978 to 1981.  They find a significant positive association between 
the monthly dispersion in analysts’ forecasts of annual earnings per share (EPS) and 
monthly trading volume1.   Barron (1995) provides additional support for Karpoff’s 
(1986) prediction that trading is caused by both differential prior beliefs and differential 
belief revisions.  By examining the correlation between the relative positions of 
individual analysts’ current and prior forecasts of earnings to measure differential belief 
revisions, Barron finds that this variable explains trading volume better than prior 
dispersion in forecasts.  Kandel and Pearson (1995) use quarterly earnings 
announcements and daily volume and return data surrounding these dates to test their 
hypothesis that abnormal trading volume during announcement periods occurs because 
                                                 
1 Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift (1991) measure dispersion as the standard deviation across analysts divided by 
the absolute value of the mean EPS forecast during the current month.  Also, they measure volume as the 
fraction of outstanding shares traded. 
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investors have differential interpretations of the announcements.  They find that there are 
economically and statistically significant positive abnormal volumes associated with 
quarterly earnings announcements even in the absence of price change. Bamber, Barron 
and Stober (1997) also find that both pre- and post-announcement dispersion are related 
to trading volume.  They take a closer look at investor disagreement (heterogeneous 
interpretations) and break it into three distinct sources.  Those sources of dispersion are:  
1) dispersion in prior beliefs – the level of variation in expectations before the earnings 
announcement, 2) change in dispersion – the difference in the level of dispersion in 
beliefs after versus before the earnings announcement and 3) belief jumbling – when 
investors’ beliefs change positions relative to each other around the earnings 
announcement.  Bamber, Barron and Stober (1999) take a second look at investor 
disagreement focusing only on differential interpretations and find two conditions under 
which differential interpretations play a significant role in explaining trading.  These two 
conditions are 1)  trading coincident with small price changes reflects investors’ 
differential interpretations of information and 2)  differential interpretations explain a 
significant amount of the trading occurring in a sample where trading volume is higher 
than the (firm-specific) non-announcement period average.  These results also support 
Kandel and Pearson (1995). 
2.2.2.3. Macroeconomic Announcements 
 
Other studies have investigated the impact of macroeconomic announcements on 
trading volume.  In general, these studies have had mixed results.  Castanias (1979) 
measures the variability of stock prices based on the impact of macroeconomic events 
and relates these variations to trading volume under the assumption that volume is 
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indicative of the impact of information.  Castanias finds a significant relation between 
macroeconomic announcements by the Fed and stock prices.  Jain (1988) also examines 
trading volume response to macroeconomic announcements, but considers hourly volume 
responses to announcements about the money supply, the consumer price index (CPI), the 
producer price index (PPI), industrial production and the unemployment rate.  Jain finds 
that only surprises about the money supply and CPI are significantly associated with 
price changes in about one hour and, in contrast to Castanias, volume is not significantly 
affected by any of these announcements. 
2.2.2.4. Miscellaneous News Announcements 
 
Studies of specific news sources and trading volume have shown a significant 
relation between the two.  Most frequently, researchers have analyzed stocks 
recommended in regular columns of The Wall Street Journal and found a significant but 
temporary spike in trading volume after publication of the recommendations.  Liu, Smith 
and Syed (1990), Barber and Loeffler (1993) and Bing (1999) examine the impact of 
specific The Wall Street Journal columns on common stock prices and find significant 
abnormal returns on the publication day coupled with higher trading volume.   
The relation between simply the number of news announcements and trading 
volume, however, has been found to be weak. Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) study the 
relation between the number of news announcements reported daily by Dow Jones & 
Company (the parent company of The Wall Street Journal) and aggregate measures of 
securities market activity including trading volume and market returns and find that they 
are directly (but weakly) related.  Berry and Howe (1994) also relate the number of news 
releases to aggregate measures of market activity but examine the Reuter’s News Service 
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and consider intraday market activity.  They find a positive, moderate relation between 
public information and trading volume but an insignificant relation to price volatility. 
With respect to unanticipated news or events, Lee (1992) separates trading 
volume into buyer- and seller- initiated activities and examines the volume reaction to 
good news and bad news.  Lee finds that good (bad) news triggers brief, but intense 
buying (selling) in large trades but any type of news triggers a persistent period of buying 
activity in small trades.  Similarly, Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) examine the effect of 
firm-specific NYSE trading halts on volume and price volatility.  After comparing 
volume and price volatility for firms on days where trading was halted to days where 
trading was not halted, they find that trading halts increase both volume and volatility.  
Volume is 230% higher after a trading halt than after a firm-matched control period and 
this increased volume persists into the third post-halt day.  Controlling for media 
coverage reduces the impact, but does not eliminate it completely.  Brooks, Patel and Su 
(2003) examine how the equity markets react to events that are unanticipated in timing 
and content and find that selling pressure, wider spreads and higher volume remain 
significant for over an hour.   
2.2.3. Trading Volume Patterns 
 
 Researchers have also provided evidence of trading volume patterns within the 
trading day and certain anomalies that are visible when examining trading across the days 






2.2.3.1. Day-of-the-week Patterns 
 
The most prominent trading volume patterns show that trading volume is lowest 
on Mondays when the market is dominated by individual as opposed to institutional 
investors.  Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) consider trading patterns of individual and 
institutional investors related to the day of the week on the NYSE and find that Monday 
is the day with the lowest trading volume and the most individual (versus institutional) 
traders and that trades are more often characterized as sell orders (as opposed to buy 
orders).  Foster and Viswanathan (1993b) find that, consistent with Lakonishok and 
Maberly’s (1990) documentation of the ‘Weekend Effect’, volume is low and adverse 
selection costs are high on Monday.   
2.2.3.2. Intraday Trading Volume Patterns 
 
Trading volume appears to be highest relative to some very specific market 
events.  Stoll and Whaley (1990) provide evidence of increased intraday trading volume 
on ‘triple-witching’ days.   ‘Triple-witching’ days are the third Friday in March, June, 
September and December when options, index options and futures contracts all expire 
simultaneously.  These days are marked by notoriously heavy program trading 
(computer-driven buying or selling of baskets of 15 or more stocks by index arbitrage 
specialists or institutional traders).  Stoll and Whaley find evidence of substantially 
higher volume in the last half hour of expiration days but that price behavior is not 
significantly different from stocks that are not subject to program trading and that any 
Friday price declines are typically reversed on the following Monday. 
For actively traded firms, trading volume, adverse selection costs, and return 
volatility are higher in the first half-hour of the day.  Kamara (1997) reinvestigates this 
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effect and finds that it declines significantly over the period from 1962 – 1993 for S&P 
500 firms and that this decline is positively related to the ratio of institutional to 
individual trading volume.    However, for small stocks, the effect is unchanged over the 
sample period due to higher trading costs (which are the same for institutions and 
individuals).  Wang, Li and Erickson (1997) provide evidence that this effect occurs 
primarily in the last two weeks (fourth and fifth weeks) of the month. 
2.2.3.3. Tax Trading 
 
Tax trading or buying and selling behavior that is motivated by tax incentives has 
also allowed researchers to document a prominent pattern in trading volume.  Tax trading 
is most prominent at year-end as investors adjust their portfolios with respect to potential 
capital gains taxes (credits) owed (due them) based on their investment gains (losses).  
Many studies provide empirical evidence that there are tax motives to trading.2   
2.2.4. Stock Price, Stock Returns and Volatility 
 
Although outside the scope of this analysis, a considerable portion of the trading 
volume literature examines the relation between trading volume and either stock price or 
stock returns and the associated volatility of these prices and/or returns.  Recall from the 
earlier discussion regarding the relation between trading volume and earnings 
announcements that several researchers have found a positive relation between trading 
volume and the absolute price change in response to this new information.  However, 
                                                 
2 See Dyl (1977), Constantinides (1984), Lakonishok and Smidt (1986), Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1986), Lamoureux and Poon (1987), Bolster, Lindsey and Mitrusi (1989), Han (1995), Lasfer (1995), 
Michaely and Murgia (1995), Michaely and Vila (1995), Bremer and Kato (1996), Seida and Wempe 
(2000) for examples. 
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researchers have also found that volume occurs in the absence of price change.  Several 
studies have investigated these relations more closely. 
2.2.4.1. Price Impact 
 
 Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987) examine the effect of large block 
transactions on security prices.  After using various definitions of block ‘size’, they find 
evidence that seller-initiated trades are associated with a temporary price reduction and 
buyer-initiated trades are associated with a permanent price increase. 
 Conrad, Hameed and Niden (1994) test for the relations between trading volume 
and subsequent returns patterns in individual securities’ short-horizon returns and find 
strong evidence of a relation.  Specifically, the authors find that high-transaction 
securities experience price reversals while the returns of low-transactions securities are 
positively autocovarying – implying that information on trading activity is an important 
predictor of the returns of individual securities. 
 Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001) investigate the idea that extreme trading 
activity contains information about the future evolution of stock prices.  They find that 
stocks experiencing unusually high (low) trading volume over a day or a week tend to 
appreciate (depreciate) over the course of the following month. 
2.2.4.2. Stock Returns 
 
Hiemstra and Jones (1994) examine the dynamic relation between daily Dow 
Jones stock returns and percentage changes in New York Stock Exchange trading 
volume.  They find evidence of bidirectional nonlinear causality between returns and 
volume.  They also consider whether the nonlinear causality from volume to returns can 
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be explained by volume serving as a proxy for information flow in the stochastic process 
generating stock return variance.  Beneish and Gardner (1995) also use Dow Jones data, 
but instead of returns, they investigate the impact of changes in the composition of the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) on the stock market.  However, they find that firms 
removed from the index experience significant price declines. 
Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) find that stock trading volume is a significant 
determinant of the lead-lag patterns observed in stock returns.  Specifically, they find that 
daily and weekly returns on high volume portfolios lead returns on low volume portfolios 
after controlling for size and that this is not explained by nonsynchronous trading or low 
volume portfolio autocorrelations.  Instead, they find that their result is due to the fact 
that returns on low volume portfolios respond more slowly to information in market 
returns. 
Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001) analyze the relation between 
expected equity returns and the level as well as the volatility of trading activity.  They 
find a negative and significant cross-sectional relation between stock returns and the 
variability of dollar trading volume and share turnover after controlling for size, book-to-
market ratio, momentum and the level of dollar volume or share turnover. 
Chen, Hong and Stein (2001) use trading volume to predict future daily returns in 
individual stocks.  They find that negative skewness in daily returns is most pronounced 
in stocks that have experienced an increase in trading volume relative to trend over the 
prior six months and positive returns over the prior 36 months. 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyan (2002) examine the relation between returns 
and trading activity measuring this activity as order imbalance (buy orders minus sell 
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orders).  They find that order imbalance increases (decreases) following market declines 
(increases) and that these imbalances reduce liquidity. 
Using a sample of NYSE/AMEX stocks, Llorente, Michaely, Saar and Wang 
(2002) use time-series regression analysis to find the relation between each firm’s current 
return  and volume and future return.  Using a variety of proxies for the degree of 
speculative trading, such as market capitalization and bid-ask spread, they compare each 
firm’s return relations (current compared to future) to its degree of speculative trading.  
They find that small and illiquid firms are often marked by return continuation following 
high-volume days and large and highly liquid firms have return reversals after high-
volume days.  These results provide empirical support for their model. 
2.2.4.3. Volatility-Volume Relation 
 
Chan and Fong (2000) examine the roles of the number of trades, size of trades 
and order imbalance in explaining the volatility-volume relation for a sample of NYSE 
and Nasdaq stocks.  They find that the size of the trades has greater importance than the 
number of trades in explaining the volatility-volume relation in both markets.  This 
confirms the findings of Barclay and Warner (1993) who argue that if informed traders 
prefer to break up trades so that they can camouflage their trades with liquidity traders, it 
might be optimal for them to submit medium-sized orders. In that case, the volatility 
impact of medium-sized trades can be the greatest among trades of different sizes, and we 






2.2.5. Analyst Forecasts 
 
 Finally, many studies consider the impact of financial analysts and their earnings 
forecasts on stock prices and volume.  Studies as early as Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) 
followed by Womack (1996) find that there is information content in analysts forecasts.  
Once this was established, the empirical focus switched to determining the usefulness of 
these forecasts in empirical research as proxies for market expectations.  Several studies 
provided convincing evidence that analyst forecasts beat other proxies such as prediction 
models based on time series analysis in their predictive abilities.3  In this examination, 
researchers also noted that analysts’ forecasts become more accurate and less dispersed as 
the forecast horizon decreases.  It is important to note, however, that later studies such as 
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) have found some evidence of underreaction by analysts.  
However, Rajan and Servaes (1997) find that analysts are overoptimistic about the 
earnings potential and long term growth prospects of recent initial public offering (IPO) 
firms. 
 An interesting caveat to the issue of the use of analyst forecasts as a proxy for 
market expectations exploits the basic assumptions that must be made.  Specifically, the 
researcher must assume that the forecasts reflect analysts’ private information in an 
unbiased manner.  Trueman (1994) provides evidence to the contrary.  Trueman (1994) 
shows the tendency of analysts to release forecasts too close to the actual earnings 
announcement than is appropriate.  This tendency necessitates the exclusion of these 
forecasts in certain empirical research.  Also, Trueman (1994) provides evidence that 
analysts exhibit herding behavior wherein they release forecasts that are similar to 
                                                 
3 See Fried and Givoly (1982) and O’Brien (1988). 
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recently released forecasts of other analysts and not necessarily based on their own 
information.  Such a tendency may also skew analyst forecast data if not addressed 
empirically.  A later study by Cooper, Day and Lewis (2001) explores the issue of analyst 
herding further.  The paper divides analysts into leaders (those analysts who publish their 
reports) and followers (those analysts who publish similar reports after the leader 
analysts) based on the timeliness of their respective forecasts.  They find that lead 
analysts have a greater impact on stock prices than follower analysts.  Recognizing that 
herding exists, Kim and Pantzalis (2003) find that its existence can be value-reducing for 
the companies being covered.  They found the effect to be more pronounced for 
diversified firms. 
Other studies accept analyst forecasts as proxies for market expectations and 
examine the changes in consensus surrounding earnings announcements.   Morse, 
Stephan and Stice (1991), for example find that market expectations diverge (consensus 
decreases) after an earnings announcement.  In the spirit of Bamber (1987), they attribute 
this divergence of opinion to  the level of surprise contained in the announcement.  They 
find that there is a greater divergence of forecasts when the earnings announcement 
contains a bigger surprise.4  This surprise element appears to have significance in 
explaining the impact of changes in consensus on trading volume because studies that do 
not account for surprise find very different results.  Barron, Harris and Harris (2001), for 
example, find changes in uncertainty after an earnings announcement to be negatively 
related to trading volume.  Using the measurement tools developed by Barron, Kim, Lim 
                                                 








 Trading volume has been a popular subject of theoretical and empirical 
research in both the accounting and finance literature.  The main findings point to many 
factors that affect trading volume.  Namely, researchers have provided theoretical and 
empirical evidence that the level of information asymmetry present in the market, the 
precision of investors’ information, the level of surprise contained in new information 
and the amount of pre-event and post-event investor consensus impact trading volume.  
However, there is not conclusive evidence regarding which of these factors has the 
greatest impact on volume.
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Chapter 3:  Data and Methodology 
 
3.1. The Model 
 
3.1.1.  Background 
 
Karpoff (1986) shows that the dispersion of beliefs both prior to and following 
public announcements is related to trading volume.  Karpoff (1986) provides two 
propositions to explain this relation.  First, the model proposes that when new 
information is interpreted differently by market participants, normal liquidity and 
speculative trading is increased due to an increase in the overall dispersion of beliefs.  
Second, even if investors interpret new information in the same way, because their prior 
beliefs differ, individuals will still revise their beliefs in accordance with the new 
information causing a change in dispersion and an increase in trading volume.  Ajinkya, 
Atiase and Gift (1991) and Barron (1995) provide empirical support for this argument 
using analyst forecasts.  Kim and Verrecchia (1991b) assert that differences in the 
precision of traders’ prior information cause them to make different belief revisions 
triggering positive abnormal trading volume.  Their theory indicates that trading volume 
is proportional to both the absolute price change and a measure of differential precision 
across traders and that expected volume and variance of price change are increasing 
functions of the precision of the announced information and decreasing functions of the 
amount of preannouncement public and private information.  Kim and Verrecchia (1994) 
show that differential interpretations of information could also be due to the fact that 
some traders are able to make better decisions than others based on the same information. 
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With the exception of Kim and Verrecchia (1994), much of this early study of the 
relation between trading volume and investor beliefs assumed homogeneous 
interpretations of information across investors.  Kandel and Pearson (1995), hereafter 
KP(1995), focus on heterogeneous interpretations of information.  Using analyst 
forecasts, they document cases in which agents’ means move in different directions 
labeling them ‘flips’ or ‘divergences’.  A ‘flip’ is a case where agent expectations cross 
such that  
 ,( ) ( ),i i j j i j i jsign Y X sign Y X X X Y Y− ≠ − > <  (3.1) 
where X and Y represent agent’s prior and posterior belief respectively and i and j 
represent the agents.  A ‘divergence’ is a case where the agents’ belief revisions move in 
opposite directions such that 
 ( ) ( ) ,i i j j j i j isign Y X sign Y X Y Y X X− ≠ − − > −  (3.2) 
Table I provides numerical examples of these two phenomena.  In both cases, agents i 
and j have prior beliefs of 8 and 4 respectively and revise these beliefs in opposite 
directions.  In the case of the ‘flip’, agents i and j have posterior beliefs of 4 and 8 
respectively.  Here, the agents swap or ‘flip’ beliefs such that the agent with the lower 
prior belief has the higher posterior belief.  In the case of divergence, the magnitude of 
the revisions is such that the posterior beliefs (4 and 10) are farther apart than the prior 






Table I:  Examples of a Flip and a Divergence 
This table illustrates the phenomena of ‘flips’ and divergence as defined by Kandel and Pearson (1995) 
where a ‘flip’ is a case where ,( ) ( ),i i j j i j i jsign Y X sign Y X X X Y Y− ≠ − > <  and a divergence is a case 
where ( ) ( ) ,i i j j j i j isign Y X sign Y X Y Y X X− ≠ − − > −  where X and Y represent agent’s prior and 
posterior belief respectively and i and j represent the agents. 
Panel A:  Flip 
Agent Prior Beliefs (X) Posterior Beliefs (Y) Sign(Y – X) 
i 8 4 (-) 
j 4 8 (+) 
i-j 4 -4  
Panel B:  Divergence 
Agent Prior Beliefs (X) Posterior Beliefs (Y) Sign(Y – X) 
i 8 4 (-) 
j 4 10 (+) 
|j-i| 4 6  
 
Bamber, Barron and Stober (1999), hereafter BBS(1999), extend KP(1995) by 
categorizing equations (3.1) and (3.2) as inconsistent reactions to information where one 
agent interprets information as ‘good’ and the other interprets it as ‘bad’.  BBS(1999), 
however, show that agents can have consistent reactions to information (both ‘good’ or 
both ‘bad’) but still have flips and divergences in beliefs.  In addition, they illustrate the 
convergence of beliefs in response to new information. 
 I examine these three types of belief revisions outlined in prior research:  ‘flips’, 
‘divergences’ and ‘convergences’.  Further, I expand my analysis to address the impact of 
these belief revisions on market liquidity as opposed to only trading volume.  I show that 
the level of market liquidity following new information is a function of the change in the 
overlap in the probability distributions that represent buyer and seller reservation prices.  
This theory provides further definition to prior empirical findings that indicate that 
differential interpretations of information (whether consistent or inconsistent) alone 
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impact trading volume.  Instead, this theory predicts that the change in the degree of 
belief dispersion predicts market liquidity. 
3.1.2.  Assumptions 
 
In my two-period model, there is one traded asset that is in fixed supply and three 
types of market participants:  buyers, sellers and a trade-maximizing specialist.  This 
model is loosely based on the model developed in Karpoff (1986).  There are no 
transactions costs, dividends or interest payments.  In the first period (t=0), buyers do not 
own any units of the traded asset while sellers are endowed with one unit.  Also, because 
buyers and sellers can hold only zero or one unit of the traded asset in either period, 
short-selling is not allowed5.  The function of the specialist is only to act as an auctioneer 
or facilitator matching the buy and sell orders.  Therefore, the specialist does not hold any 
units of the traded asset in either period and therefore does not buy or sell from his/her 
own inventory in order to ensure market liquidity or maintain order6. 
Buyers and sellers are heterogeneous in their personal valuation of the asset either 
due to asymmetric information or differences in the interpretation of identical 
information across participants.  Based on his/her individual valuation of the asset, each 
buyer and seller sets his/her first-period (t=0) reservation price.  Dispersion in initial 
reservation prices (p0), therefore, can indicate differences in expectations, risk 
                                                 
5 This assumption serves to ensure that the populations strictly represent either buyers or sellers.  However, 
I realize that this assumption is not realistic in a practical sense.  Also, according to Miller (1977) and 
Deither et. al. (2002) whenever market participants with lower valuations of an asset are constrained (that 
is, they are prohibited from short selling), prices are biased upward because they reflect only the trades of 
the market participants with higher valuations and volume is therefore biased downward. 
 
6 This market system is essentially a double call auction market where market participants submit limit 
orders to the specialist once each period.  In continuous time, this assumption can be generalized to liken 
the market to a double continuous call auction market where the specialist only sets the starting price. 
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preferences or ‘informedness’7.  Buyers and sellers communicate these reservation prices 
to the market in the form of limit orders submitted to the specialist.  These prices are 
assumed to be lognormally distributed.  If the logarithms of the buyer and seller prices 
are plotted, they resemble two bell-shaped curves that may or may not overlap.  
Comparatively, these distributions can be described in terms of their respective means 
and variances.  Therefore, a pair of buyer/seller reservation price (limit order) 
distributions can be classified in one of four ways:  1)  equal means, equal variances, 2)  
equal means, unequal variances, 3)  unequal means, equal variances and 4)  unequal 
means, unequal variances.  It is important to note that the case where the two population 
distributions have equal means and equal variances will have the greatest amount of 
overlap because the two distributions will be identical.  Therefore, this case represents the 
highest probability of trade. 
Figures 1 through 4 provide examples of these cases.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Buyer and Seller Limit Orders
Trade-Maximizing Price
  
Figure 1:  Distributions of Buyer and Seller Orders with Equal Means and Equal 
Variances 
This figure illustrates the distributions of buyer and seller limit orders with equal means and equal 
variances.  The specialist will set the trade-maximizing price at the point where the distributions of 
buyer and seller limit orders intersect.  Only orders that lie in the circled region of overlap between 
the two distributions will be executed. 
 
                                                 











Figure 2:  Distributions of Buyer and Seller Orders with Equal Means and Unequal 
Variances 
This figure illustrates the distributions of buyer and seller limit orders with equal means and unequal 
variances.  The specialist will set the trade-maximizing price at the point where the distributions of 
buyer and seller limit orders intersect.  Only orders that lie in the circled region of overlap between 
the two distributions will be executed. 
 









Figure 3:  Distributions of Buyer and Seller Orders with Unequal Means and Equal 
Variances 
This figure illustrates the distributions of buyer and seller limit orders with unequal means and equal 
variances.  The specialist will set the trade-maximizing price at the point where the distributions of 
buyer and seller limit orders intersect.  Only orders that lie in the circled region of overlap between 










Figure 4:  Distributions of Buyer and Seller Orders with Unequal Means and 
Unequal Variances 
This figure illustrates the distributions of buyer and seller limit orders with unequal means and 
unequal variances.  The specialist will set the trade-maximizing price at the point where the 
distributions of buyer and seller limit orders intersect.  Only orders that lie in the circled region of 




The specialist compiles the buy and sell orders in a limit order book and executes 
all marketable trades.  The specialist sets a price that will maximize the number of 
executed orders.  I refer to this price as ‘trade-maximizing’ as opposed to ‘market-
clearing’ to emphasize the fact that not necessarily all orders that fall in the region of 
intersection (R) between buyer and seller orders will be executed.  This is because order 
imbalance (quantity of buy orders not equal to quantity of sell orders) may exist.  
Alternatively, R can be interpreted as the proportion of total possible trades in the limit 
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order book that actually occur.  However, an order will only be executed if it lies in this 
region.  In the case depicted in Figure 4, for example, the specialist will set the trade-
maximizing price between 5.5 and 7.0.  Table II shows a portion of the limit order book 
that generates the probability distributions depicted in Figure 4.   
Table II:  Trade-Maximizing Specialist’s Limit Order Book 
This table gives an example of the ten ‘best’ orders in the trade-maximizing specialist’s limit order book.  
All buy orders are sorted in descending order from highest bid price to lowest bid price and all sell orders 
are sorted in ascending order from lowest ask price to highest ask price.  The specialist will set a price that 
maximizes the number of executable trades.   
Order Number Buy Orders Sell Orders 
1 7.0 5.5 
2 6.0 7.5 
3 6.0 7.5 
4 6.0 7.5 
5 6.0 7.5 
6 6.0 7.5 
7 5.0 7.5 
8 5.0 7.5 
9 5.0 7.5 
10 5.0 7.5 
 
 From Table II, it is clear that the prices in R are between 5.5 and 7.0 and the 
specialist will set the price within this range.  Therefore, only the first order in the book 
will be executed8.    When the distributions have equal means, the price will be set at that 
mean value.  When the distributions have unequal means, the optimal price can be 
determined mathematically.  Because trade is restricted to R, the area of R represents the 
probability that a trade will occur.  The point at which the two distributions intersect can 
be determined by setting the probability density functions (pdfs) of the buy and sell order 
                                                 
8 Of course, the specialist may create a market imbalance depending upon where he/she sets the price.  If 
the specialist were required to maintain ‘order’ in the market, he/she would have to fill orders using his/her 
own inventory. That is, if he/she sets the price less than or equal to 6.0 in this example, buy orders two 
through six would represent unmet demand.  The specialist, then, would be required to step in and fill these 




distributions equal to each other and solving for the point at which they intersect (x).  
Under the assumption of lognormally distributed prices, the pdfs of the logarithms of 
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In the example depicted in Figure 4, the logged buyer prices are distributed N ~ (4,14.06) 
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gives two results (x = 6.57 and 10.15) indicating that the distributions intersect in two 
places. The intersection point that lies within the region of consensus must take a value 
that is between the means of the two distributions.  Thus, the trade-maximizing price in 
this example is 6.57.  The area of R is the sum of the area under the intersecting tails of 
the two distributions.  That is, 
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where the first integral references the sell order distribution and the second integral 
references the buy order distribution.  In the example depicted in Figure 4, the probability 
of a transaction as indicated by the area of R is 35%.  This results from a 10% probability 
that a sell order will lie in the lower tail of the seller price distribution and a 25% 
probability that a buy order will lie in the upper tail of the buyer price distribution.  
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Because this portion of the two tails overlap or cross, the overall probability that an order 
will be executed is the sum of these two probabilities which is 35%.   
3.1.4. Belief Revisions 
 
Between periods, buyers and sellers receive new information and revise their 
individual reservation prices accordingly.  They communicate these belief revisions to the 
specialist through new limit orders.  The resulting change in market liquidity depends 
upon the change in the area of R.  If the area of R increases (decreases), market liquidity 
is expected to increase (decrease).   
Key characteristics of buyer and seller belief revisions affect trading.  These are 
homogeneity versus heterogeneity, convergence versus divergence and the relative 
magnitude of the revisions.  There are 11 observable combinations of these 
characteristics.  First, homogeneous (consistent) belief revisions indicate that both the 
buyers and sellers revise their reservation prices in the same manner (either both upward 
or both downward).  Heterogeneous (inconsistent) belief revisions indicate that buyers 
and sellers revise their reservation prices in opposite directions.  Second, the distance 
between the mean buyer and seller reservation prices (limit orders) can either increase,  
decrease or remain constant.  An increase in this distance indicates that the dispersion 
across these two groups is increasing -- implying a divergence of beliefs.  A decrease in 
this distance indicates that dispersion across these two groups is decreasing – implying a 
convergence of beliefs.  Third, the magnitude of the belief revisions can be such that the 
buyers in period t0 have the higher reservation price for the asset in period t1.  Figures 5 – 
15 illustrate these 11 cases.  These figures all illustrate belief revisions relative to the 
 
 38
same set of prior beliefs which are those depicted in Figure 3.  In this case, the buy and 
sell order distributions have unequal means, but equal variance. 
 










 Figure 5:  Consistent Convergent Belief Revisions 
This figure shows investor belief revisions across time periods as represented by their corresponding 
limit orders.  In this case, both distributions move in the same direction (upward) and the distance 
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 Figure 6:  Consistent Convergent Flip Belief Revisions 
This figure shows investor belief revisions across time periods as represented by their corresponding 
limit orders.  In this case, both distributions move in the same direction (upward) and the distance 
between the two means decreases.  However, the magnitude of the revisions is such that the buyers 
have a higher mean posterior belief than the sellers. 
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 Figure 7:  Consistent Divergent Belief Revisions 
This figure shows investor belief revisions across time periods as represented by their corresponding 
limit orders.  In this case, both distributions move in the same direction (upward) but the distance 














 Figure 8:  Consistent Divergent Flip Belief Revisions 
This figure shows investor belief revisions across time periods as represented by 
their corresponding limit orders.  In this case, both distributions move in the same 
direction (upward) but the distance between the two means increases.  Also, the 
magnitude of the revisions is such that the buyers have a higher mean posterior 
belief than the sellers. 
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Figure 9:  Consistent Constant Belief Revisions 
This figure shows investor belief revisions across time periods as represented by their corresponding 
limit orders.  In this case, both distributions move in the same direction (upward) and the distance 














 Figure 10:  Inconsistent Convergent Belief Revisions 
This figure shows investor belief revisions across time periods as represented by their corresponding 
limit orders.  In this case, the distributions move in opposite directions but the distance between the 
two means decreases.  Also, the magnitude of the revisions is such that the buyers have a higher 
mean posterior belief than the sellers 
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 Figure 11:  Inconsistent Convergent Flip Belief Revisions 
This figure shows investor belief revisions across time periods as represented by their corresponding 
limit orders.  In this case, the distributions move in opposite directions but the distance between the 
two means decreases.  Also, the magnitude of the revisions is such that the buyers have a higher 
mean posterior belief than the sellers 
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 Figure 12:  Inconsistent Divergent Belief Revisions 
This figure shows investor belief revisions across time periods as represented by their corresponding 
limit orders.  In this case, the distributions move in opposite directions and the distance between the 














 Figure 13:  Inconsistent Divergent Flip Belief Revisions 
This figure shows investor belief revisions across time periods as represented by their corresponding 
limit orders.  In this case, the distributions move in opposite directions and the distance between the 
two means increases.  Also, the magnitude of the revisions is such that the buyers have a higher mean 
posterior belief than the sellers. 
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 Figure 14:  Inconsistent Constant Flip Belief Revisions 
This figure shows investor belief revisions across time periods as represented by their corresponding 
limit orders.  In this case, the distributions move in opposite directions but the distance between the 
two means does not change.  Also, the magnitude of the revisions is such that the buyers have a 
higher mean posterior belief than the sellers. 
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 Figure 15:  Consistent Constant Flip Belief Revisions 
This figure shows investor belief revisions across time periods as represented by their corresponding 
limit orders.  In this case, both distributions move in the same direction (upward), and the distance 
between the two means does not change.  Also, the magnitude of the revisions is such that the buyers 
have a higher mean posterior belief than the sellers. 
 
The main predictions of the model (assuming that the means of the buyer and seller price 
distributions change, but the variances do not) are as follows. 
  
PROPOSITION 1:  The probability of a transaction between a buyer and a seller at any point 
in time is a function of the area of the region of overlap of their corresponding reservation 
price distributions. 
  
PROPOSITION 2:  If buyers and seller revise their reservation prices in a consistent manner 




COROLLARY 1:  If buyers and sellers revise their reservation prices in a consistent 
manner, but the difference in their mean reservation prices decreases (because the mean 
buyer revision is greater than the mean seller revision),  volume will increase on the 
interval t= (0, 1). 
 
This is the case of consistent convergence  (depicted in Figure 5) and documents the 
case of two market participants that both revise their beliefs in the same manner (either 
both upward or both downward) resulting in a decrease in across-group dispersion.   
COROLLARY 2:  If buyers and sellers revise their reservation prices in a consistent 
manner, the difference in their mean reservation prices decreases and the mean buyer 
price in t=1 is greater than the mean seller price in t=1, volume will increase on the 
interval t= (0, 1) more so than if the mean buyer price in t=1 is not greater than the mean 
seller price in t=1 as in Corollary 1. 
 
This is the case of a consistent convergent flip and is depicted in Figure 6.  In this 
case, two market participants revise their beliefs in the same direction and dispersion 
decreases (consensus increases), but the magnitude of the revisions are such that the 
valuations cross and the participant with the higher prior valuation has the lower posterior 
valuation and vice versa.   
COROLLARY 3:  If buyers and sellers revise their reservation prices in a consistent 
manner, but the difference in their mean reservation prices increases (because the mean 
seller revision is greater than the mean buyer revision),  volume will decrease on the 
interval t= (0, 1). 
 
This is the case of consistent divergence (depicted in Figure 7), which documents 
the case of two market participants that both revise their beliefs in the same manner 
(either both upward or both downward) resulting in an increase in dispersion. 
COROLLARY 4:  If buyers and sellers revise their reservation prices in a consistent 
manner, the difference in their mean reservation prices increases and the mean buyer 
price in t=1 is greater than the mean seller price in t=1, volume will increase on the 




This is the case of a consistent divergent flip and is depicted in Figure 8.  In this case, 
two market participants revise their beliefs in the same direction and dispersion increases 
(consensus decreases), but the magnitude of the revisions are such that the valuations 
cross and the participant with the higher prior valuation has the lower posterior valuation 
and vice versa.   
 
COROLLARY 5:  If seller reservation prices change by the same amount as buyer 
reservation prices, volume will be unchanged on the interval t=(0,1). 
 
This is the case of a consistent constant revision which is depicted in Figure 9.  
Here, buyers and sellers revise their reservation prices in the same direction (either both 
upward or both downward) and by the same amount. 
COROLLARY 6:  If buyers and sellers revise their reservation prices in a consistent 
manner, the difference in their mean reservation prices does not change and the mean 
buyer price in t=1 is greater than the mean seller price in t=1, volume will increase on the 
interval t= (0, 1). 
 
This is the case of a consistent constant flip and is depicted in Figure 15.  In this 
case, two market participants revise their beliefs in the same direction and dispersion 
remains constant (the degree of consensus does not change), but the magnitude of the 
revisions are such that the valuations cross and the participant with the higher prior 
valuation has the lower posterior valuation and vice versa. 
 
PROPOSITION 3:  If buyers and sellers revise their reservation prices in an inconsistent 
manner, the resulting change in volume is a function of the magnitude of the revisions. 
 
COROLLARY 1:  If buyers and sellers revise their reservation prices in an inconsistent 
manner, but the difference in their mean reservation prices decreases (because the mean 
buyer revision is greater than the mean seller revision),  volume will increase on the 




This is the case of inconsistent convergence which is depicted in Figure 10 and 
was first noted by KP(1995).  It documents the case of two market participants who 
revise their beliefs such that the participant with the higher valuation of the asset revises 
his/her valuation downward and the participant with the lower valuation revises upward 
resulting in a decrease in dispersion.   
COROLLARY 2:  If buyers and sellers revise their reservation prices in an inconsistent 
manner, the difference in their mean reservation prices decreases and the mean buyer 
price in t=1 is greater than the mean seller price in t=1, volume will increase on the 
interval t= (0, 1) more so than if the mean buyer price in t=1 is not greater than the mean 
seller price in t=1 as in Corollary 1. 
 
This is the case of an inconsistent convergent flip, depicted in Figure 11 in which 
the buy order and sell order distributions change places.  In this case, two market 
participants revise their beliefs in opposite directions and dispersion decreases (consensus 
increases), but the magnitude of the revisions are such that the valuations cross and the 
participant with the higher prior valuation has the lower posterior valuation and vice 
versa. 
 
COROLLARY 3:  If buyers and sellers revise their reservation prices in an inconsistent 
manner, but the difference in their mean reservation prices increases (because the mean 
seller revision is greater than the mean buyer revision),  volume will decrease on the 
interval t= (0, 1). 
 
This explains inconsistent divergence (depicted in Figure 12) and documents the case 
of two market participants revising their beliefs such that the participant with the higher 
valuation of the asset revises his/her valuation upward and the participant with the lower 
valuation revises downward resulting in a decrease in dispersion.  The result of this case 
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of belief revisions is an increase in dispersion across groups as the distance between the 
two belief distributions increases. 
 
COROLLARY 4:  If buyers and sellers revise their reservation prices in an inconsistent 
manner, the difference in their mean reservation prices increases and the mean buyer 
price in t=1 is greater than the mean seller price in t=1, volume will increase on the 
interval t= (0, 1). 
 
This is the case of an inconsistent divergent flip, depicted in Figure 13 in which 
the buy order and sell order distributions change places.  In this case, two market 
participants revise their beliefs in opposite directions and dispersion increases (consensus 
decreases), but the magnitude of the revisions are such that the valuations cross and the 
participant with the higher prior valuation has the lower posterior valuation and vice 
versa. 
 
COROLLARY 5:  If sellers revise their reservation prices downward and buyers revise their 
beliefs upward by an amount exactly equal to  the difference in their t=0 reservation 
prices, volume will be unchanged on the interval t=(0,1). 
 
This is the case of an inconsistent constant flip, depicted in Figure 14 in which the 
buy order and sell order distributions change places.  In this case, two market participants 
revise their beliefs in opposite directions and dispersion remains constant (the degree of 
consensus does not change), but the magnitude of the revisions are such that the 
valuations cross and the participant with the higher prior valuation has the lower posterior 
valuation and vice versa. 
In summary, a pair of belief revisions can be either consistent or inconsistent 
depending on whether or not the market participants have homogeneous or heterogeneous 
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interpretations of new information and these beliefs can either converge or diverge 
resulting in a decrease or increase in dispersion respectively.  Graphically, consistent 
(inconsistent) revisions are marked by buyer and seller price distributions with a greater 
(lesser) amount of overlap than was observable prior to the belief revision.  The 
consistency (or inconsistency) of belief revisions alone does not predict changes in 
market liquidity.  Instead, the joint effect of the consistency of belief revisions and the 
magnitude of those belief revisions are predictors of changes in market liquidity.  Table 
III shows the change in the probability of trade due to the changes in the distributions of 
buyer and seller prices in all 11 belief revision cases illustrated in Figures 5 – 15. 
Table III:  Change in the Probability of Trade due to Specific Types of Belief 
Revisions 
This table documents the change in the probability of trade based on the examples illustrated in Figures 5 
– 14. 
Panel A:  t=0 
Mean Standard  
Deviation Type of Belief Revision 





All Cases 4 8 3.75 3.75 6.0 60%
Panel B:  t=1 
Mean Standard  
Deviation Type of Belief Revision 





Consistent Convergent 6.0 9.0 3.75 3.75 7.5 68%
Consistent Convergent Flip 10.0 9.0 3.75 3.75 9.5 90%
Consistent Divergent 6.0 11.0 3.75 3.75 8.5 50%
Consistent Divergent Flip 14.0 9.0 3.75 3.75 11.5 50%
Consistent Constant 6.0 10.0 3.75 3.75 8.0 60%
Inconsistent Convergent 5.0 7.0 3.75 3.75 6.0 78%
Inconsistent Convergent Flip 7.0 6.0 3.75 3.75 6.5 90%
Inconsistent Divergent 3.0 9.0 3.75 3.75 6.0 42%
Inconsistent Divergent Flip 10.0 4.0 3.75 3.75 7.0 42%
Inconsistent Constant Flip 8.0 4.0 3.75 3.75 6.0 60%




From these examples, it appears that the convergence of beliefs has the strongest and 
most consistent impact on the probability of trading.  In the four cases of divergent belief 
revisions, the probability of trading decreases.  In the two cases of constant belief 
revisions, the probability of trading is unchanged.  In the four cases of convergent belief 
revisions, the probability of trading increases.   The other two characteristics of belief 
revisions, consistency versus inconsistency and the flipping phenomena produce unstable 
results.  That is, the impact of these characteristics on the probability of trading is less 
clear. 
 
3.2. Testable Hypotheses 
 
The propositions discussed in the previous section lead to the following testable 
hypotheses.  First, I address the base notion that there is an inverse relation between 
market liquidity and overall dispersion.  That is, I hypothesize that as the overall variance 
in investor beliefs increases, market liquidity decreases.  The underlying intuition is that 
market liquidity occurs because actual investor beliefs are clustered around consensus – 
that point at which all investors have identical beliefs regarding an asset’s true value.  In 
the absence of liquidity traders, trading would not occur when there is complete 
consensus because either all investors have no desire to own the traded asset or all 
investors wish to own the traded asset.  In this rare instance it would be impossible for a 
transaction to occur.  Instead, I hypothesize that investor beliefs tend to cluster around 
consensus. The more tightly these beliefs are clustered, the more investors will transact. 




H1: There is an inverse relation between overall dispersion and market 
liquidity. 
 
An underlying assumption of Karpoff (1986) is that owners of an asset have higher 
reservation prices for an asset than non-holders.  Because this is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for my hypotheses, this statement is a data requirement for empirical 
tests.  For example, when classifying investors, those with higher reservation prices 
would then be classified as holders and those with lower reservation prices would be 
classified as non-holders.   
Figure 16 shows a graphic representation of this requirement where non-holders have 
a mean reservation price of four units and holders have a mean reservation price of eight 
units. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Non-Holders Holders
Non-Holders ' Mean 
Demand Price
Holders ' Mean Demand 
Price
 
Figure 16:  Comparison of Holder versus Non-Holder Reservation Prices 
This figure shows the distribution of reservation prices for investors that hold a particular asset as 
compared to the distribution of reservation prices for investors that do not hold a particular asset. 
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Karpoff (1986) considers the impact of differential priors and differential 
interpretations of new information separately.  To consider the impact of differential 
interpretations on trading volume, he assumes homogeneous prior beliefs.  Here, a group 
of individuals with the same beliefs trade because some new piece of information 
introduced to the market has caused belief dispersion within this group.  With respect to 
the framework of holders and non-holders, this means that within the holders (non-
holders) group an increase in the dispersion of beliefs causes trading volume to increase.  
I expect that increased dispersion within groups increases trading9.  This argument is the 
basis for my second hypothesis: 
H2:  Within-group dispersion and volume are positively related. 
Figure 17 shows a graphic representation of this hypothesis using the non-holders 
from Figure 16.  Recall that this group has a mean reservation price of 4 units.  In Figure 
17, the variance of the reservation price distribution is initially 4 units, but increases to 
6.25 units.   
To consider the impact of differential priors, Karpoff (1986) assumes homogeneous 
interpretations of information.  Here, two groups of individuals with different beliefs 
trade because some new piece of information introduced to the market has caused them to 
revise their beliefs.  That is, the dispersion of beliefs across these two groups has 
changed.  With respect to the framework of holders and non-holders, this means that if 
non-holders change their beliefs more than holders, volume will increase, and if holders 
change their beliefs more than non-holders, volume will decrease.   
                                                 
9 I state this hypothesis with respect to increased trading as opposed to simply trading to account for the 
fact that liquidity (noise) traders are a constant within the framework of this model and therefore some level 
of trading is always present in the market.  Liquidity traders, then, account for part of the “jumbling” of 
reservation prices in the Karpoff (1995) model. 
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Figure 17:  An Increase in Within Group Reservation Price (Belief) Dispersion 
This figure shows the change in the distribution of reservation prices for investors that hold a 
particular asset when the mean reservation price remains constant but the dispersion (standard 
deviation) increases. 
 
The direction of the revision is also relevant to the change in volume.  For 
example, if holders have an initial valuation of $8 while non-holders have an initial 
valuation of $4, if both holders and non-holders revise their valuations and the amount of 
the revision is unequal, there are three possible scenarios: 
1) Both could revise upward.  If non-holders revise more, say from $4 to 
$8 while holders revise only from $8 to $10, the difference in 
valuations across the groups will decrease from $4 to $2 resulting in 
an increase in volume. 
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2) Both could revise downward.  If non-holders revise from $4 to $0 
while holders revise from $8 to $6, in arithmetic terms, holders are 
revising more than non-holders because -2 are greater than -4.  In this 
case, the difference in valuations across the groups will increase from 
$4 to $6 resulting in a decrease in volume. 
3) The two groups could revise in opposite directions.  That is, one group 
revises upward and one group revises downward.  If, for example, 
non-holders revise from $4 to $8 while holders revise from $8 to $6, 
in arithmetic terms, non-holders are revising more than holders 
because +4 is greater than -2.  In this case, the difference in valuations 
will decrease from $4 to $2 resulting in an increase in volume. 
In this case, the information is perceived identically, however the volume reaction 
is due to the differences in the priors of the two groups.  That is, holders will react less to 
good information and more to bad information.  Conversely, non-holders will react more 
to good information and less to bad information.  These expected behaviors are due to the 
fact that good information merely confirms the prior beliefs of the holders and bad 
information confirms the prior beliefs of the non-holders.  Therefore, non-holders are 
expected to change their beliefs more than holders after good information is introduced to 
the market and holders are expected to change their beliefs more than non-holders after 
bad information is introduced to the market.  If good information is introduced to the 
market confirming holders’ prior beliefs, non-holders will raise their bid prices 
substantially while holders will make minimal revisions and therefore the probability of 
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exchange (and subsequently actual market liquidity) between holders and non-holders 
will increase.   
Using across group dispersion as a measure of these belief revisions, this means 
that an increase in dispersion is related to a decrease in market liquidity and a decrease in 
dispersion is related to an increase in market liquidity.  Therefore, I hypothesize (stated 
alternatively) that: 
H3: Changes in the dispersion in beliefs across the holders and non-
holders group are related to market liquidity. 
H3a: A decrease in the dispersion of beliefs across the 
holders and non-holders groups is positively related 
to market liquidity. 
H3b: An increase in the dispersion of beliefs across the 
holders and non-holders groups is negatively related 
to market liquidity. 
 
Figures 18 and 19 show graphic representations of H3a and H3b respectively assuming 
upward reservation price revisions by both holders and non-holders.  This hypothesis 
expects that as the difference in means between the two sub-populations (holders and 
non-holders) becomes smaller, market liquidity increases.  Therefore, comparing the 
difference in means in the prior period to the difference in means in the current period 
tests this hypothesis.  This hypothesis requires that the difference in the differences (or 
the change in the difference in means) is inversely related to market liquidity. 
Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Bamber, Barron and Stober (1997) provide evidence, 
however, that these homogeneous interpretations of information are unrealistic.  They 
document cases where analysts have heterogeneous interpretations of new information.  
They label these cases “flips” and “divergences” as discussed previously.  H2, however, 
would still capture these phenomena, because it considers changes in the actual (not 
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absolute) difference in population means.  Figures 18 and 19 illustrate the case of 
homogeneous interpretations for simplicity.   
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Figure 18:  A Decrease in Across Group Reservation Price (Belief) Dispersion 
This figure shows the change in the distribution of reservation prices for two groups of investors that 
hold a particular asset when the within group dispersion (standard deviation) remains constant but 
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Figure 19:  An Increase in Across Group Reservation Price (Belief) Dispersion 
This figure shows the change in the distribution of reservation prices for two groups of investors that 
hold a particular asset when the within group dispersion (standard deviation) remains constant but 
the difference between the mean reservation prices for the two groups increases. 
 
 
Specifically, convergences and divergences imply that 
H3c: Divergence (convergence) of beliefs is positively 




However, “flips” are a special case in which beliefs begin to converge but investors’ 
belief revisions are so great that the investor with the higher expectation initially becomes 
the investor with the lower expectation and vice versa.  Therefore 
 
H3d: Flips of beliefs are positively related to market 
liquidity. 
 
Kim and Verrecchia (1997) argue that while it is the information that investors have 
regarding the asset that influences investors’ reservation price decisions, it is unrealistic 
to expect that only one type of information (pre-event or event-period) is available to 
investors.  Therefore, I consider simultaneous changes in both within group dispersion 
and across group dispersion. 
H4: An increase in within-group dispersion accompanied by a decrease 
in across-group dispersion is positively related to market liquidity. 
 
For completeness, I consider the case of no change in dispersion. 
 
H5: If there is no change in within-group and/or across-group 




I test the hypotheses developed in the previous section using analyst forecasts as 
proxies for investor beliefs and a number of measures of market liquidity.   I create a 
belief dispersion dataset to be used under the assumption of a continuous flow of 
information.  In this dataset, I disaggregate the market into ‘buyers’ and ‘sellers’ The 
dataset contains monthly data from 1990 to 2002 with respect to trading volume, returns 
and market capitalization.  This first dataset uses only volume-related variables from the 
Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) as measures of market liquidity, while a 
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second dataset also incorporates data from the New York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE) 
Trade and Quote (TAQ) database to measure market liquidity.  The second dataset is 
used under the assumption of a discrete flow of information.  It contains daily data   from 
1990 to 2002 with respect to trading volume, returns and market capitalization as well as 
average spreads, depth and trade size from 1995 to 1998. 
 I obtain analyst forecasts from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S)10.  As of March 2003, the I/B/E/S database consists of 7,585,519 forecasts 
covering 10,951 firms.  These forecasts are further subdivided based on periodicity.  
There are four major periodicity subdivisions.  These are annual, semi-annual, quarterly 
and miscellaneous.  These subdivisions are further classified according to the forecast 
horizon.  That is, an analyst estimating a firm’s annual earnings per share for the current 
fiscal year would be classified differently than when the same analyst estimates the same 
firm’s annual earnings for the next fiscal year.  Table IV provides a breakdown of the 
entire I/B/E/S database as of March 2003. 
It is important to note that while the number of forecasts for a given periodicity or 
the entire dataset can be summed to arrive at a total number of forecasts, this is not true 
for the number of firms.  There is not a consistent pattern of continuity for firm 
representation across periodicities and/or horizons in the database.  That is, a firm can be 
represented in one, several or all horizons within a periodicity or one, several or all 
periodicities within the database as a whole.  Therefore, I analyze the database separately 
for each periodicity and each horizon to find the number of firms represented. 
 
                                                 




Table IV:  I/B/E/S Historical Earnings Estimate Database 
This table provides a breakdown of the I/B/E/S historical earnings estimate database as of March 2003 by 
periodicity and horizon.  Periodicity indicates the type of fiscal period reflected in the estimate.  Horizon 
reflects the number of periods between the estimate date and the fiscal period.  A horizon of 1 indicates that 
the estimate reflects the current fiscal period.  A horizon of 2 indicates the fiscal period one year after the 
current fiscal period and so on. 
Panel A:  Annual Earnings Estimates 











> 10 fiscal years 1,670 456
Total 3,999,919 10,942
Panel B:  Semi-Annual Earnings Estimates 





> 4 semi-annual periods 4 2
Total 846 321
Panel C:  Quarterly Earnings Estimates 









> 8 quarters 14,342 2,620
Total 3,584,754 9,595
Panel D:  All Earnings Estimates 








The majority (99.9%) of the forecasts in the database reflect either annual or 
quarterly periodicities.  Within these two classifications, there are slightly more annual 
(52.7%) than quarterly (47.3%) forecasts.  Also, almost all firms (99.9%) are represented 
by the annual forecasts while a much smaller proportion of firms (87.5%) are represented 
by the quarterly forecasts.  In fact, only nine companies in the entire I/B/E/S database do 
not have at least one annual forecast on file11.  For these reasons, I use only the annual 
forecasts in my analysis.   
Another trend in the data is that the number of forecasts decreases dramatically as 
the horizon lengthens.  Of the 3,999,919 annual forecasts in the database, the majority 
(94.6%) of these forecasts are for the current fiscal year and the year following the 
current fiscal year.  Within these two classifications, there are slightly more current fiscal 
year forecasts (55.3% versus 44.7%).  O’Brien (1988) finds evidence that the most 
current analyst forecast weakly dominates the mean and median forecast with respect to 
accuracy.  This finding is consistent with the idea that information regarding a firm’s 
business operations for a given fiscal year is more plentiful as the fiscal year nears its 
end.  Because analysts rely heavily on this information to prepare their reports (which 
contain their estimate of the firm’s earnings per share), it follows that forecasts with the 
shortest horizons would be the most accurate.  For this reason and the fact that the 
shortest horizon forecasts are most plentiful in the database, I further restrict my analysis 
to annual forecasts for the current fiscal year. 
Based on the data restrictions described thus far, I next analyze all annual, current 
fiscal year forecasts.  For some forecasts, I/B/E/S cannot identify the analyst making the 
                                                 
11 These companies are Amerivest Properties, Correctional Properties, Lexford Inc., Inkine 




estimate.  All forecasts of this type are flagged with an analyst code of ‘0’.  Therefore, 
this code could represent numerous analysts and some of these analysts may already be 
represented elsewhere in the database.  In the parts of my analysis that involve tracking 
forecast revisions of specific analysts, I cannot use these forecasts.  Therefore, I calculate 
the number of forecasts, analysts and firms by year with and without these forecasts.  
Table V provides a breakdown of these forecasts by year based on the date of the 
forecast. 
Table V:  Annual Current Fiscal Year Earnings Estimates 
This table provides a breakdown of all annual current fiscal year earnings per share estimates in the I/B/E/S 
historical earnings estimate database as of March 2003 by year.  The values in parentheses represent 
frequencies after excluding all forecasts where I/B/E/S cannot determine what analyst made the forecast. 
The estimates are categorized based on the date that the forecast is made. 
Panel A:  1981 - 1989 
Year Number of Forecasts Number of Analysts Number of Firms 
1981 30         (29) 30     (29) 24     (24)
1982 8,638    (8,453) 1,628(1,627) 1,559(1,546)
1983 57,248  (55,423) 2,287(2,286) 2,227(2,215)
1984 68,977  (67,728) 2,289(2,288) 2,517(2,509)
1985 85,033  (83,031) 2,499(2,498) 2,851(2,830)
1986 88,362  (85,939) 2,482(2,481) 3,041(3,022)
1987 90,653  (88,841) 2,507(2,506) 3,285(3,265)
1988 89,740  (87,414) 2,424(2,423) 3,314(3,286)
1989 87,721  (84,824) 2,681(2,680) 3,317(3,242)
Total 576,402(561,682) 6,042(6,041) 4,501(4,465)
Panel B:  1990 - 1999 
Year Number of Forecasts Number of Analysts Number of Firms 
1990 90,541     (88,719) 2,536(2,535) 3,361(3,274)
1991 90,983     (88,754) 2,307(2,306) 3,341(3,273)
1992 92,067     (89,967) 2,180(2,179) 3,484(3,448)
1993 96,985     (93,735) 2,408(2,407) 3,751(3,739)
1994 97,978     (95,133) 2,775(2,774) 4,280(4,233)
1995 107,358   (105,250) 3,033(3,032) 4,648(4,610)
1996 113,161   (111,131) 3,402(3,401) 5,309(5,271)
1997 119,652   (118,169) 3,890(3,889) 5,798(5,778)
1998 133,698   (132,810) 4,278(4,277) 5,910(5,884)
1999 134,737   (133,092) 4,425(4,424) 5,933(5,894)





Panel C:  2000 - 2002 
Year Number of Forecasts Number of Analysts Number of Firms 
2000 131,733(129,980) 4,581(4,580) 5,754(5,730)
2001 140,961(134,614) 4,361(4,360) 5,071(5,002)
2002 136,266(134,829) 4,590(4,589) 4,961(4,916)
Total 408,960(399,423) 6,959(6,958) 6,616(6,562)
Panel D:  2003 
Year Number of Forecasts Number of Analysts Number of Firms 
2003 31,040(29,868) 3,299(3,298) 4,052(3,971)
Panel E:  All Years 
Year Number of Forecasts Number of Analysts Number of Firms 
1981 – 1989 576,402   (561,682) 6,042(6,041) 4,501  (4,465)
1990 – 1999 1,077,160(1,056,760) 8,204(8,203) 8,659  (8,609)
2000 – 2002 408,960   (399,423) 6,959(6,958) 6,616  (6,562)
2003 31,040     (29,868) 3,299(3,298) 4,052  (3,971)
Total 2,093,562(2,047,733) 15,325(15,324) 10,907(10,824)
 
 Note that as with the number of firms represented in a given time period, the 
number of analysts cannot be summed to arrive at a total number of analysts represented.  
Again, there is not a consistent pattern of continuity for firm or analyst representation 
across years in the database.  That is, a firm or analyst can be represented in one, several 
or all years within the database.  Therefore, I analyze the database separately for each 
year and subset of years to find the number of firms and analysts represented. 
 The number of forecasts, analysts and firms in the I/B/E/S database grows fairly 
steadily from 1981 to 1989.  There are over nine times as many forecasts made in 1989 
(87,721) as there are forecasts made in 1982 (8,638) representing a 64.6% increase in the 
number of analysts represented and a 112.8% increase in the number of firms 
represented. Over the period from 1990 to 1999, the increases in the size and 
representation of the database are significant, with the bulk of the growth focused on the 
representation of analysts and firms as compared to the previous decade.  The number of 
forecasts increases by 48.8% while the number of analysts and firms increases by 223.5% 
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and 157.6% respectively.  In 2000, as the United States stock markets begin to decline, 
the number of forecasts and firms represented in the I/B/E/S database falls as well.  Most 
noticeably, the average number of firms represented in the database declines significantly 
from an actual level of 5,933 firms represented in 1999 to an average of 5,223 firms 
represented in the years 2000 through 2002. 
 Tables IV and V relate the number of forecasts, analysts and firms using ratios 
between these elements of the data by year and by month respectively.  The number of 
forecasts per analyst and the number of forecasts per firm reflect the ratio of total 
forecasts in a given year to the total number of unique analysts and firms, respectively.  
However, I calculate the number of firms per analyst and the number of analysts per firm 
in a more complex manner.  This is because one analyst may cover more than one firm 
and a simple ratio of unique firms to unique analysts would not capture this overlap.  
Instead, for each year I obtain the number of analysts following each unique firm such 
that each unique firm (i) in a sample year is followed by Ni analysts where 
( ) ( )1, 2, , 1, 2, ,ii n and N N∈ ∈… … .  I then sum this figure across all firms and divide the 
total by the number of unique firms in that year.  In other words, I calculate the average 










Similarly, to obtain the number firms that each analyst covers, I obtain the number of 
firms covered by each unique analyst such that each unique analyst (j) in a sample year 
covers nj firms where ( ) ( )1, 2, , 1, 2, ,jj N and n n∈ ∈… … .  I then sum this figure across 
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all analysts and divide the total by the number of unique analysts in that year.  In other 
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Table VI:  Annual Relations Between the Number of Forecasts, Analysts and Firms 
This table provides a breakdown of the ratios between the number of forecasts and analysts, the number of 
forecasts and firms and the number of analysts and firms in the I/B/E/S historical earnings estimate 























1981 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.21 1.21
1982 5.20 5.04 1.03 5.47 5.30
1983 24.24 11.00 2.20 25.02 11.36
1984 29.60 11.37 2.60 26.99 10.37
1985 33.24 12.39 2.68 29.34 10.93
1986 34.64 13.21 2.62 28.44 10.84
1987 35.45 12.83 2.76 27.21 9.85
1988 36.08 12.69 2.84 26.60 9.35
1989 31.65 11.74 2.70 26.16 9.70
1990 35.00 10.87 3.22 27.10 8.42
1991 38.49 11.38 3.38 27.12 8.02
1992 41.29 12.27 3.37 26.09 7.76
1993 38.94 12.65 3.08 25.07 8.15
1994 34.29 11.54 2.97 22.47 7.56
1995 34.71 11.19 3.10 22.83 7.36
1996 32.68 10.78 3.03 21.08 6.96





1998 31.05 9.60 3.23 22.57 6.98
1999 30.08 9.53 3.16 22.58 7.15
2000 28.38 9.14 3.11 22.68 7.31
2001 30.87 8.84 3.49 26.91 7.70
2002 29.38 8.45 3.48 27.43 7.89




Table VII:  Monthly Relations Between the Number of Forecasts, Analysts and 
Firms 
This table provides a breakdown of the ratios between the number of forecasts and analysts and the number 
of forecasts and firms per month in the I/B/E/S historical earnings estimate database as of March 2003 by 
year.  The estimates are categorized based on the date that the forecast is made. 
Year Number of Forecasts per 
Analyst per Month 
Number of Forecasts per 



























 Taken together (and excluding 1981, 1982 and 2003 as outliers due to incomplete 
data), Tables VI and VII show interesting trends in analyst coverage.  The average 
analyst reports two to four forecasts per month while the average firm is reported on by 
one to three analysts each month.  Also, during the sample period, over the course of one 
year, the average analyst follows a minimum of 8.45 firms in 2002 and a maximum of 
13.21 firms in 1986.  A minimum of 6.77 analysts cover each firm in 1997 and a 
maximum of 11.36 analysts follow each firm in 1983. 
In order to limit the number of observations in my final sample, I prefer to 
analyze only 10 full years of data ending with the most recent year of complete data.  
This requirement would restrict my dataset to the years 1993 through 2002.  However, 
because of the state of the stock market (and the economy as a whole) in the United 
States throughout all of the 1990s, I extend this dataset to include all forecasts made 
during the years 1990 through 2002. 
3.3.1. Belief Dispersion Dataset 
 
 Because I require stock return data for my analysis, I next match the I/B/E/S 
database to the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database.  Because 
I/B/E/S and CRSP use different unique identifiers (I/B/E/S ticker and PERMNO 
respectively) in their databases to distinguish between firms, this matching is a multi-step 
process.   
First, I generate a list of unique I/B/E/S tickers represented for each year of the 
sample period.  I compare these lists to the I/B/E/S identifier file in order to find the 
official ticker symbol for each company.  I match these files on an annual basis in order 
to automate the process.  I separate the I/B/E/S identifier file into 13 overlapping smaller 
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files each corresponding with a different year of my sample (1990 – 2002).  Thus, the 
smaller files grow increasingly larger as the identifier file reflects changes made to 
company’s CUSIP numbers, official ticker symbols or official names.  Official tickers 
change over time while I/B/E/S tickers do not.  Therefore, I sort each I/B/E/S identifier 
sub-file in descending order such that for each I/B/E/S ticker, the first entry in the file is 
actually the most current entry for the respective year.  Then, I use an automated lookup 
function to search the file for the first record for each I/B/E/S ticker.  The function then 
returns the most recent official ticker for the firm as of the end of the sample year.  After 
matching all I/B/E/S tickers to their official ticker symbols for each year of the sample, I 
follow the same process to match the official ticker symbols to their respective CRSP 
PERMNOs.   
 Next, I aggregate the forecast data by firm, by the fiscal year estimated and by the 
month and year that the estimates are made.  This step redefines an observation as a firm-
month as opposed to an individual forecast.  Thus, the number of observations is greatly 
reduced and each observation now reflects the mean value of all forecasts made in a 
specific month for a specific fiscal year for a specific firm.  Table VIII reports the 
corresponding reductions in the number of observations in each year of the sample as I 
aggregate the forecasts by firm-month. 
Once the forecasts are aggregated into firm-months, I impose several restrictions 
on the data to generate the final dataset.  First, recall that I am interested in examining the 
effect of belief dispersion on market liquidity using analyst forecasts as a proxy for 
investor beliefs.  Therefore, in order to have dispersion among analysts (investors), there 




Table VIII:  Aggregation of Analyst Forecasts 
This table reports the results of aggregating all forecasts by firm and the month that the forecast is made.  
All forecasts made in the same month for the same firm result in one firm-month.   
Year Total Number of Forecasts 
Total Number of 
Firm-Months 
Average Number of 
Forecasts per Firm-
Month 
1990 90,541 26,798 3.38
1991 90,983 26,768 3.40
1992 92,067 28,014 3.29
1993 96,985 29,282 3.31
1994 97,978 31,533 3.11
1995 107,358 34,611 3.10
1996 113,161 36,812 3.07
1997 119,652 39,922 3.00
1998 133,698 40,674 3.29
1999 134,737 39,064 3.45
2000 131,733 37,523 3.51
2001 140,961 33,189 4.25
2002 136,266 32,924 4.14
 
Second, because I am interested in studying the interactions between potential 
buyers and sellers of a traded asset, I distinguish those forecasts that proxy for potential 
buyers from those forecasts that proxy for potential sellers.  I can do this in a number of 
ways.   
I can match the analysts’ forecasts to their corresponding recommendation.  It 
would be reasonable to expect that analysts making ‘buy’ recommendations have higher 
valuations for a traded asset than analyst making ‘sell’ recommendations for that same 
traded asset.  Recall that ‘holders’ (‘non-holders’) are defined as investors who own (do 
not own) the traded asset and are thus assumed to have higher (lower) valuations for the 
asset.  It follows, then, that analysts making ‘buy’ recommendations proxy for ‘holders’ 
and analysts making ‘sell’ recommendations proxy for ‘non-holders’.  Many recent 
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studies, however, have shown that buy-side analysts exhibit considerable bias in issuing 
recommendations primarily due to conflicts of interest and the way in which they are 
compensated.  Analysts employed by brokerage firms that underwrite the securities 
offerings of the traded companies that they follow have an incentive to issuing more 
positive recommendations for these firms than if this investment banking relationship did 
not exist.  Also, buy-side analysts typically follow firms whose securities they or others 
within their brokerage firm attempt to sell to firm clients.  The securities issued by a 
traded company with a favorable recommendation are easier to sell than the securities 
issued by a traded company with an unfavorable recommendation.  Finally, 
representatives of traded companies may be less inclined to provide information to 
analysts who give unfavorable recommendations for their company.  The possibility of 
limited information upon which to base their financial analysis may also deter an analyst 
from issuing an unfavorable recommendation for a traded company.  All of these issues 
represent potential reasons for bias in analyst forecasts.  Also, there is significant 
empirical evidence that this upward bias does, in fact, exist.  Trueman (1994), for 
example, provides evidence that analyst forecasts are not necessarily unbiased reflections 
of analysts’ private information.  A principal result of Trueman (1994) is that analysts 
tend to issue earnings forecasts that are close to prior earnings expectations even if their 
own research suggests that the firm’s earnings may differ significantly from prior 
expectations.  The existence of this bias in forecasts makes the use of analyst 




Alternatively, I can base the distinction between ‘holders’ and ‘non-holders’ on 
the assumption that ‘holders’ have higher valuations of the traded asset than ‘non-
holders’.  Therefore, it is reasonable to calculate the mean or median value of all 
forecasts for a given firm in a given month and classify all forecasts that are higher than 
the mean (or median) as ‘holders’ and all forecasts below the mean (or median) as ‘non-
holders’.  I use this method of differentiating ‘holders’ and ‘non-holders’.  This 
methodology is consistent with the practice whereby investors observe the ‘consensus’ 
forecast and make investment decisions accordingly.  Typically, the ‘consensus’ forecast 
is the mean value of all forecasts made for a given firm in a given time period.  
Therefore, I classify all forecasts that are greater than the mean forecast value for a firm-
month as ‘holders’ and all forecasts that are less than or equal to the mean forecast value 
for a firm-month as ‘non-holders’.  Again, because dispersion of beliefs is my primary 
concern in this study, I require that within the ‘holder’ and ‘non-holder’ groups there 
exists at least two forecasts so that I can observe dispersion within each group. 
Next, I obtain monthly data from CRSP for each firm in the sample and match it 
to the remaining observations.  In order to match the CRSP data to the I/B/E/S data, I first 
match the forecast data to the identifier file described previously.  This file contains the 
I/B/E/S ticker, official ticker symbol and CRSP PERMNO for every firm represented in 
the dataset.  I match this file to the forecast file by I/B/E/S ticker and then match this new 
file to the CRSP data by CRSP PERMNO.  Table IX reports the number of firms lost at 





Table IX:  Creation of the Final Dataset 
This table documents the beginning number of observations (firm-months), the reasons for dropping 
observations from the sample and the final number of observations remaining when creating the final dataset. 
Reason for Dropping Observations 



























1990 26,798 10,520 9,598 1,732 21,850(81.5) 4,948
1991 26,768 10,377 9,681 1,671 21,729(82.1) 5,039
1992 28,014 10,885 10,343 1,716 22,944(81.9) 5,070
1993 29,282 10,886 11,422 1,740 24,048(82.1) 5,234
1994 31,533 12,394 12,300 1,597 26,291(83.4) 5,242
1995 34,611 13,749 13,540 1,851 29,140(84.2) 5,471
1996 36,812 15,024 14,221 1,898 31,143(84.6) 5,669
1997 39,922 17,001 14,999 1,859 33,859(84.8) 6,063
1998 40,674 16,681 15,062 2,186 33,929(83.4) 6,745
1999 39,064 16,076 14,019 1,878 31,973(81.8) 7,091
2000 37,523 15,254 13,556 1,468 30,278(80.7) 7,245
2001 33,189 12,083 11,292 1,408 24,783(74.7) 8,406
2002 32,924 12,257 11,104 1,316 24,677(75.0) 8,247
 
 There are four reasons why observations are dropped from the final sample.  First, 
if there is only one forecast for a firm-month, I cannot calculate overall dispersion.  
Therefore, all firm-months with only one forecast are dropped from the final sample.  I 
drop, on average, 40 percent of all observations in each sample year due to this 
restriction.  Second, once ‘holder’ forecasts are differentiated from ‘non-holder’ 
forecasts, I drop all firm-months that do not represent at least two ‘holder’ and two ‘non-
holder’ forecasts.  This data requirement allows me to calculate dispersion within both 
the ‘holder’ and ‘non-holder’ group for each firm-month.  I drop, on average, an 
additional 37 percent of all observations in each sample year due to this restriction.  
Taken together, these two restrictions require a firm to have at least four forecasts in a 
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given month with at least two of them being above the mean and two below the mean in 
order to be included in the final sample.  I drop, on average, 76 percent of all 
observations in each sample year due to these dispersion requirements. 
 Third, I drop all observations where complete data is not available from CRSP. 
There are four reasons why firms are dropped from the sample at this stage.  First, if the 
I/B/E/S identifier file does not contain an official ticker symbol for a firm, this firm 
cannot be matched with a CRSP PERMNO and is therefore dropped from the sample.  
Second, because stock exchanges reissue ticker symbols, but I/B/E/S tickers are unique, 
in some cases an I/B/E/S ticker corresponds to more than one official ticker symbol.  To 
avoid the possibility of matching these firms incorrectly in CRSP, all I/B/E/S tickers that 
can be matched to more than one official ticker symbol in a given year are dropped from 
the sample.  Third, firms are dropped from the sample because they are not found in the 
CRSP database.  A cursory review of a sample of firms not found in CRSP reveals that 
these firms are typically either no longer trading, are trading via ‘pink sheets’ or are 
traded in the over-the-counter (OTC) market12.  Finally, CRSP data is incomplete or 
contains error codes for some firms.      On average, I drop an additional five percent of 
the total observations due to difficulties in matching the forecast file to CRSP. 
 In summary, these three issues, the number of forecasts per firm-month, the 
number of holder and non-holder forecasts per firm-month and the availability of 
matching CRSP data result in the loss of 82 percent of the total observations. 
                                                 
12 Pink Sheets (whose name is based on the fact that they were originally printed on pink paper) are a daily 
publication compiled by the National Quotation Bureau containing price quotations for over-the-counter 




3.3.2. Belief Revision Dataset 
 
In order to study the impact of the various patterns of belief revisions, I create a 
second dataset.  I restrict this dataset to firms whose fiscal year ends in December.  Also, 
I examine only annual forecasts and annual forecast revisions made around the quarterly 
earnings announcements.  Table X describes the I/B/E/S actual earnings database. 
 
Table X:  I/B/E/S Historical Actual Earnings Database 
This table provides a breakdown of the I/B/E/S historical actual earnings database as of March 2003 by 
fiscal year.   








1976 2,448 0 0
1977 2,749 0 1
1978 3,012 0 0
1979 3,266 0 0
1980 3,418 0 5
1981 3,430 0 22
1982 4,337 0 299
1983 4,647 0 9,845
1984 4,835 0 13,797
1985 4,828 0 14,927
1986 5,457 0 19,971
1987 5,926 0 25,081
1988 5,957 0 27,433
1989 5,912 0 26,491
1990 6,124 0 25,353
1991 6,117 0 24,231
1992 6,167 6 23,473
1993 6,796 3 24,029
1994 7,426 0 27,242
1995 8,342 0 29,451
1996 8,930 0 31,937
table continued 
                                                 
13 There are 44 semi-annual announcements in the actual earnings database.  These announcements 
represent 13 firms:  British Steel PLC, Fujitsu, Grand Met PLC, Imperial Tobacco, Mandarin Orient, Marui 
Co., Overseas Un Bank, Polygram, Reuters, Sumitomo Mitsui, Trinity Biotech, Terremark World and 




1997 8,981 3 33,877
1998 8,799 11 33,392
1999 8,309 10 31,937
2000 7,540 8 29,101
2001 6,871 3 26,457
2002 5,174 0 23,054
2003 139 0 425
Total 156,317 44 501,831
 
Table XI:  Annual Forecasts Before and After Quarterly Earnings Announcements 
This table reports the number of annual forecasts in the I/B/E/S database in the period from 45 days prior to 
the quarterly earnings announcement to 30 days after the quarterly earnings announcement relative to each 
quarter from the period beginning January 1983 and ending December 2002. 
Year First Quarter Second Quarter Third Quarter Fourth Quarter 
1983 6,083 6,693 3,202 2,158
1984 7,302 6,845 6,951 2,936
1985 8,695 6,582 9,598 2,599
1986 7,037 8,433 8,271 2,761
1987 8,701 9,193 8,842 2,845
1988 10,269 9,130 9,973 3,117
1989 10,222 10,831 11,695 3,338
1990 11,951 11,373 13,182 3,535
1991 13,749 12,969 13,843 3,576
1992 12,702 13,763 14,781 3,843
1993 13,416 14,238 14,849 5,291
1994 14,295 13,424 14,225 5,765
1995 14,565 14,875 16,237 5,856
1996 16,005 16,574 18,026 5,742
1997 17,053 18,028 19,596 6,183
1998 18,927 21,225 22,270 6,808
1999 20,944 21,035 22,329 5,802
2000 20,233 20,011 20,201 5,958
2001 20,667 20,460 25,403 5,678




I extract only those forecasts made 45 days prior to and 30 days following the 
quarterly earnings announcements for firms whose fiscal year ends in December14.  Table 
XI reports the number of forecasts that fall within this time frame relative to each of the 
160 quarters from the quarter beginning January 1983 to the quarter ending December 
2002.   
 
Table XII separates the forecasts that are made during the window (-45,+30) 
relative to the quarterly earnings announcement with respect to the number of forecasts 
made prior to the quarterly earnings announcement and the number made after the 
quarterly earnings announcement.   
Table XII:  Annual Forecasts Before and After Quarterly Earnings Announcements 
This table reports the number of annual forecasts in the I/B/E/S database in the period from 45 days prior to 
the quarterly earnings announcement and the period 30 days after the quarterly earnings announcement 
relative to each quarter from the period beginning January 1983 and ending December 2002.  Forecasts 
made on the quarterly earnings announcement date are included in the pre-announcement (‘prior’) window. 
 First Quarter Second Quarter Third Quarter Fourth Quarter 
Year Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post Prior Post 
1983 3,100 2,983 3,503 3,190 1,539 1,663 2,158 0
1984 4,075 3,227 3,653 3,192 3,797 3,154 2,925 11
1985 5,194 3,511 4,330 2,252 4,636 4,962 2,586 13
1986 4,602 2,435 4,354 4,079 3,857 4,414 2,761 0
1987 4,678 4,023 4,653 4,540 4,070 4,772 2,842 3
1988 5,438 4,831 4,354 4,776 4,648 5,325 3,114 3
1989 5,329 4,893 5,378 5,453 5,161 6,534 3,337 1
1990 6,103 5,848 5,044 6,329 6,034 7,148 3,535 0
1991 7,470 6,279 6,194 6,775 5,977 7,866 3,576 0
1992 6,142 6,160 6,346 7,417 6,853 7,928 3,838 5
1993 6,599 6,817 6,261 7,977 6,449 8,400 5,291 0
1994 6,635 7,660 5,446 7,978 5,786 8,439 5,765 0
1995 6,606 7,959 6,341 8,534 7,033 9,204 5,854 2
1996 7,511 8,494 7,222 9,352 7,743 10,283 5,735 7
table continued 
                                                 
14 I use a 45-day pre-announcement window (as opposed to 30 days) because, as noted by Bamber, Barron 
and Stober (1999), Stickel (1989) shows that analysts are less likely to report annual earnings forecasts 




1997 7,850 9,203 7,475 10,553 8,367 11,229 6,170 13
1998 8,426 10,501 9,399 11,826 9,860 12,410 6,742 66
1999 8,903 12,041 8,602 12,433 9,557 12,772 5,696 106
2000 8,436 11,797 7,644 12,367 8,007 12,194 5,817 141
2001 9,804 10,863 9,829 10,631 11,803 13,600 5,608 70
2002 7,967 11,997 8,077 12,841 8,900 13,550 5,730 114
 
In order to examine differences in belief revisions, I impose additional data 
restrictions.  In many cases, one analyst reports more than one forecast for the same firm 
in either the pre-announcement window or the post-announcement window.  I include 
only the forecasts reported closest to the announcement date for each analyst in both 
windows.  That is, if an analyst reports more than one forecast for the same firm in either 
the pre-announcement window or the post-announcement window, I include only the 
forecast made on the event date with the lowest absolute value.  Further, I assume that an 
analyst making a forecast on the announcement date has no knowledge of the content of 
the earnings announcement at the time he/she makes his forecast.  Therefore, I include 
forecasts made on the announcement date in the pre-announcement window.  However, 
for robustness, I later create an alternate dataset where I omit all forecasts made on the 
quarterly earnings announcement date.  This dataset will eliminate any potential bias 
caused by analysts who base their forecast on the earnings announcement.   
I require that each firm in the sample has forecasts from at least two different 
analysts and that both analysts make at least one forecast no more than 45 days before the 
quarterly earnings announcement and at least one forecast within 30 days after the 
quarterly earnings announcement.   
Next, I create one observation for each firm-announcement date.  That is, every 
earnings announcement by an individual firm represents a different observation.  For 
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each firm-announcement, I collect various analyst forecast data.  Specifically, I calculate 
the descriptive statistics of all analyst forecasts made in the 45 days prior to the earnings 
announcement and the descriptive statistics of all analyst forecasts made in the 30 days 
following the announcement.  Based on the pre- and post-announcement mean analyst 
forecasts, I categorize all analyst forecasts as ‘optimists’ or ‘pessimists’ based on the 
individual forecast value relative to the mean of all forecasts.  Thus, all individual 
forecasts that are greater than the mean forecast are classified as ‘optimists’ while all 
individual forecasts that are less than the mean forecast are classified as ‘pessimists’.    
For each observation I record the I/B/E/S ticker and the mean and variance of all 
forecasts reported for in the pre- and post-announcement windows.   
I obtain volume data from CRSP for each sample firm and incorporate this data 
into the final dataset.  After deleting firms for whom CRSP data is incomplete or 
unavailable, this results in a final dataset with 5,640 observations representing 1,364 
firms.     Finally, for the observations from 1995 to 1998 I add additional data from TAQ 




3.4.1. Key Variables 
 
The dependent variable in all of my regression models is a form of market 
liquidity.  Market liquidity can be defined in a number of ways.  I examine several 
commonly used measures:  trading volume, effective spread, quoted spread, order 
                                                 
15 The TAQ data is limited to the period 1995-1998 due to availability. 
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imbalance, trade imbalance, market depth and average trade size.  It is important to note 
that the relation between these variables and market liquidity may differ.  For example, a 
high level of trading volume is indicative of a liquid market whereas a large spread 
(either effective or quoted) would indicate an illiquid market. 
With respect to trading volume, I specifically examine turnover.  I calculate 
abnormal turnover according to the simple model of Tkac (1999) which argues that firm 
turnover should equal market turnover under normal circumstances.  This argument is 
based on the theoretical prediction that market-wide trading translates into trading in each 
asset according to its relative value in the market.  According to Tkac, although this 
model is simple, it should isolate idiosyncratic trading activity.  Further, Tkac attributes 
undertrading (overtrading) possibly to less (more) non-rebalancing activity.  In other 
words, fewer (more) investors are trading these stocks based on firm-specific 
information.  In the context of informed versus uninformed traders, this model separates 
the informed from the uninformed traders so that an analysis of the resulting abnormal 
(idiosyncratic) volume actually allows me to examine the behavior of informed traders.  
Therefore, I measure turnover (Turnover ) for an individual firm as 
 shares traded
shares outstanding
Turnover =  (3.9) 
I measure market turnover using data from all firms (i) in the CRSP database.  I calculate 














I calculate abnormal turnover, then, as 
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 AbnormalTO Turnover MktTurnover= −  (3.11) 
 
I test my hypothesis regarding belief revision characteristics using volume as well 
as alternative measures of market liquidity.  Specifically, I use the difference in the pre- 
and post-announcement averages of several alternative dependent variables:  
EffectiveSpread, QuotedSpread, OrderImbalance, TradeImbalance, MarketDepth and 
TradeSize.  EffectiveSpread is the difference between the execution price and the mid-
point of the prevailing bid-ask spread.  QuotedSpread is the quoted offer (bid) price less 
the quoted ask price prevailing at the time of the trade16.  OrderImbalance is the 
difference between the offer size and the bid size prevailing at the time of the trade.  
MarketDepth is the average of the bid size and the offer size17.  TradeSize is the actual 
number of shares exchanged. 
I use several explanatory variables related to belief dispersion and the 
characteristics of belief revisions.  With respect to belief dispersion, I first address overall 
dispersion followed by dispersion within groups of investors.  These groups, ‘holders’ 
and ‘non-holders’, represent investors that own or do not own the traded asset, 
respectively.  I measure dispersion within the ‘holder’ (‘non-holder’) group as the 
coefficient of variation in the forecasts greater than (less than) the mean value of all 












=  (3.12) 
                                                 
16 PercentageQuotedSpread is also used and is calculated as the quoted spread as a percentage of the 
midpoint of the prevailing bid-ask spread. 














=  (3.13) 
 
I also address dispersion across the two sub-groups of investors.  I calculate this 
variable, Across, as simply the difference in the mean forecasts for the two groups or 
 
 H NHAcross µ µ= −  (3.14) 
 
 When examining the characteristics of belief revisions on market liquidity, I first 
examine the magnitude of the revisions themselves.  Using the Holder/Non-Holder 
dataset, I construct dummy variables that indicate, on average, whether the ‘holder’ or 
‘non-holder’ group revised their forecasts (beliefs) more.  Therefore, DHold is a dummy 
variable that is set to 1 if the mean price revision of the holder group is greater than that 
of the non-holder group and is zero otherwise.  DNon is a dummy variable that is set to 1 
if the mean price revision of the non-holder group is greater than that of the holder group 
and is zero otherwise.  Because ‘holders’ have higher valuations than ‘non-holders’, if 
these investors revise their beliefs more, across group dispersion will increase and market 
liquidity should therefore decrease.  It is also important to note that both the DHold and 
DNon variables are needed in analysis because these cases are not mutually exclusive.  
That is, it is possible for the holders and non-holders to revise their beliefs by exactly the 
same amount.  In that case, both the DHold and DNon variables would be set to zero. 
 Alternatively, I measure dispersion and the magnitude of belief revisions 
in the two-dimensional XY space where the X-axis indicates holder demand prices and 
the Y-axis indicates non-holder demand prices.  This representation is shown in Figure 
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 Figure 20:  Belief Revisions in the XY Plane 
This figure represents pairings of mean holder and non-holder beliefs both prior to 
and following the announcement of new information.   
 
A given point in this space represents the combination of holder and non-holder 
demand prices.  That is, the point (8,4) represents a mean holder demand price of $8 and 
a mean non-holder demand price of $4.  Consensus across the two groups, is represented 
by the 45-degree line where all X-values and Y-values are equal.  Given this 
representation of holder and non-holder demand prices, I measure across-group 
dispersion as the distance between the intersection of the mean holder and mean non-
holder forecasts (any given point in the XY plane) and consensus or 
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 ( ) ( )2 2Distance H NHµ µ µ µ= − + −  (3.15) 
Also, I calculate the length and the slope of the revision path that represents the change in 










 ( ) ( )2 2H NHPathLength µ µ= ∆ + ∆  (3.17) 
 
 
 In order to address simultaneous changes in across group and within group 
dispersion, I use the belief dispersion dataset to construct additional dummy variables and 
that capture the possibility of ‘holder’ group dispersion increasing or decreasing (DHInc 
and DHDec) and ‘non-holder’ group dispersion increasing or decreasing (DNHInc and 
DNHDec).  Again, both of these variables are necessary as they are not mutually 
exclusive.  That is, it is possible for dispersion to remain constant rather than increase or 
decrease following the introduction of new information. 
 
 I create three additional dummy variables using the belief revision dataset to 
capture characteristics of belief revisions.  Diverge indicates whether the absolute 
difference between a pair of analysts’ forecasts is increasing or decreasing.  If the 
difference in the post-announcement forecasts is greater than the difference in the pre-
announcement forecasts, this variable is set to one and is zero otherwise.  Consistent 
indicates whether or not a pair analysts revise their forecast in the same direction.  That 
is, if both analysts revise upward or downward, this variable is set to one and is zero 
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otherwise.  Flip indicates whether a pair of analysts revise their forecasts in such a way 
that the analyst with the higher pre-announcement forecast has the lower post-
announcement forecast.  In this case, the variable Flip is set to one and is zero otherwise. 
The control variables I use in the model are intended to capture the effect of other 
factors beyond the dispersion of beliefs.  Specifically, I include |rjt|, the absolute 
magnitude of stock returns, to account for the positive association between market 
liquidity and the absolute magnitude of price changes found by Crouch (1970), 
Westerfield (1977), Cornell (1981), Wood, McInish and Ord (1985), Harris (1986), 
Richardson, Sefcik and Thompson (1986a) and others.  Firm size (Sizejt) is measured as 
the total market value of equity (market capitalization).  I include it as a control variable 
because more news is typically available about larger firms than smaller firms.  Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that there is less investor disagreement (dispersion of beliefs) 
regarding larger firms than smaller firms and therefore, larger firms will experience 
higher volume after news announcements than smaller firms simply due to the size 
differential.  Also, it is important to note that due to the sample selection criteria (outlined 
previously), the sample is biased toward large firms.  PriceChange accounts for the dollar 
change in a firm’s stock price coincident with an earnings announcement.  Karpoff 
(1987) points to empirical evidence suggesting that volume is positively related to the 
magnitude of the price change.  Similarly, Bamber, Barron and Cheon (1999) studied 
small price change firms and concluded that coincident trading reflects investors’ 
differential interpretations of information.  I calculate PriceChange as the natural 
logarithm of the absolute value of the difference between the stock price on the day 
following the quarterly earnings announcement and the stock price on the day prior to the 
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quarterly earnings announcement.  Consistent with Karpoff, I predict a positive 
coefficient for this variable.  Finally, I use Surprise to account for the degree of surprise 
contained in a firm’s actual earnings announcement.  I calculate this variable as the 
difference between the mean pre-announcement forecast and the actual earnings.  Bamber 
(1986) finds evidence that the degree of surprise associated with an earnings 
announcement is positively related to trading volume.  
 
3.4.2 .Empirical Tests18 
 
 In all of the empirical tests that follow, the abnormal turnover emphasis varies 
slightly depending upon the dataset used.  In the first dataset where no firm specific 
information is introduced, abnormal turnover is measured as the percentage of 
outstanding shares traded for a given firm (j) in a given month (t) minus the percentage of 
outstanding shares traded for all firms in the CRSP database in that month.  With this 
data, I observe and analyze the level of abnormal turnover relative to the level of 
dispersion both across and within groups (holders and non-holders).  In addition, as 
holder and non-holder beliefs change from month to month, I analyze the change in 
turnover relative to the change in dispersion. 
 In the second dataset where I examine changes in market liquidity relative to the 
firm’s earnings announcement, abnormal turnover is measured in the same way, but the 
change is observed as the difference between the abnormal turnover on the day after the 
announcement less the abnormal turnover on the day before the announcement. 
                                                 
18 Note that in all regression equations that follow, I list only the key variables individually and aggregate 
the control variables in a vector denoted ‘CONTROL’. 
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3.4.2.1. Hypothesis One 
 
 To test H1 regarding the relation between overall dispersion and market liquidity, 
I use the Holder/Non-Holder dataset and estimate the following panel data regression 
models (with the predicted signs of the coefficients given in parentheses): 
 
( ) ( )?
10jt jtAbnormalTO CONTROLjtb Dispa ε
−
= + + +  (3.18) 
 
( ) ( )?
1 jt0 Distancejt jtAbnormalTO CONTROLba ε
−
= + + +  (3.19) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )?
1 2 jt0 Distancejt jtAbnormalTO CONTROLjtb Disp ba ε
− −
= + + + +  (3.20) 
If there is a relation between market liquidity and overall dispersion, I expect that market 
liquidity will increase as dispersion decreases until investors reach consensus.  Therefore, 
in Equations (3.18), (3.19) and (3.20) I expect negative coefficients for the key variables 
Disp and Distance.  Both variables measure overall dispersion.  Disp is the coefficient of 
variation for all forecasts made in the same month for a given firm.  Distance is the 
geometric difference between the point of intersection of mean holder and non-holder 
beliefs and consensus.   Consensus is the point where mean holder beliefs are equal to 
mean non-holder beliefs and is represented by the line Y X=  in the XY plane. 
 
3.4.2.2. Hypothesis Two 
 
To test H2 regarding the relation between within-group dispersion and market 
liquidity, I use the belief dispersion dataset and estimate the following regression models 




( ) ( ) ( )?
1 20j jAbnormalTO CONTROLj jb HDisp b NHDispa ε
+ +
∆ = + + + +∆ ∆ (3.21) 
If there is a relation between changes in market liquidity and changes in within group 
dispersion, I expect that market liquidity will increase as the dispersion within either the 
Holder or Non-Holder group increases.  This is because an increase in within group 
dispersion would stretch the distribution of beliefs for that group such that it increases the 
overlap in the distributions of both groups.  Because trading occurs where the two 
population distributions overlap, an increase in the dispersion of either distribution (not 
necessarily both distributions) should be positively related to an increase in market 
liquidity.  Therefore, in Equation (3.21), I expect positive coefficients for the key 
variables ∆HDisp and ∆NHDisp which measure the change in Holder dispersion and 
Non-Holder dispersion, respectively. 
3.4.2.3. Hypothesis Three 
 
To test H3a and H3b regarding the relation between across-group dispersion and 
market liquidity, I use the Holder/Non-Holder dataset and estimate the following 
regression model (with the predicted signs of the coefficients given in parentheses): 
 
( ) ( )?
10jt jtAbnormalTO CONTROLjtb Acrossa ε
−
= + + +  (3.22) 
 
( ) ( )?
10j jAbnormalTO CONTROLjb Acrossa ε
−




( ) ( ) ( )?
1 20j jAbnormalTO CONTROLj jb DHold b DNona ε
− +




Equation (3.22) tests the relation between market liquidity and the level of across-
group dispersion while Equations (3.23) and (3.24) test the relation between changes in 
market liquidity and changes in across-group dispersion.  Across measures the difference 
in the means of (or the distance between) the two distributions; Holders and Non-
Holders.  If market liquidity is inversely related to the level of across-group dispersion, I 
expect a negative coefficient for the variable Across.  I measure the change in across-
group dispersion as the change in the difference in the Holder mean and the Non-Holder 
mean.  Therefore, a positive (negative) value for the variable ∆Across indicates an 
increase (decrease) in across-group dispersion.  If changes in market liquidity are 
inversely related to changes in across-group dispersion, I expect a negative coefficient for 
the variable ∆Across. 
Alternatively, I use the qualitative variables DHold and DNon to measure changes 
in across-group dispersion.  These variables indicate which of the two groups revised its 
beliefs more.  These variables are based on the foundation that the Holder population has 
a higher mean than the Non-Holder population.  For example, if the means of both 
populations increase (decrease), but the Holder mean increases (decreases) more than the 
Non-Holder mean, the population distributions will move farther apart (closer together) 
which decreases (increases) the overlap in the distributions and leads to a decrease (an 
increase) in market liquidity.  Also, if the mean of the Holder population increases 
(decreases) while the mean of the Non-Holder population decreases (increases) the 
population distributions will again move farther apart (closer together) which decreases 
(increases) the overlap in the distributions and leads to a decrease (an increase) in market 
liquidity.  If changes in market liquidity are inversely related to changes in across-group 
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dispersion, I expect a negative coefficient for the variable DHold and a positive 
coefficient for the variable DNon. 
It is important to note that I base this analysis on the actual value of the changes 
in means as opposed to the absolute value of the change.  For example, consider the case 
with prior Holder and Non-Holder means of $6 and $3 respectively.  If the means 
decrease by $2 and $1 respectively, the posterior means are $4 and $2.  The difference in 
means decreases from $3 to $2.  The change in the Holder mean is -$2 and the change in 
the Non-Holder mean is -$1.  Therefore, in this case, the Non-Holder belief revision (-$1) 
is greater than the Holder belief revision (-$2).   
To test H3c and H3d regarding the relations between the characteristics of belief 
revisions and market liquidity, I first use the Holder/Non-Holder dataset.  I estimate the 
following regression models (with the predicted signs of the coefficients given in 
parentheses): 
 
( ) ( )?
10 *j jAbnormalTO CONTROLj jb Slope DHolda ε
−
∆ = + + +  (3.25) 
 
( ) ( )?
10 *j jAbnormalTO CONTROLj jb Slope DNona ε
+
∆ = + + +  (3.26) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )?
1 20 *j
j
AbnormalTO j j j
CONTROL
b Slope DHold b PathLengtha
ε
− +
∆ = + +
+ +
 (3.27) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )?
1 20 *j
j
AbnormalTO j j j
CONTROL
b Slope DNon b PathLengtha
ε
+ +






( ) ( ) ( )









b DHold b DNona
b PathLength b Slope ε
− +
+
∆ = + +
+ + + +
 (3.29) 
In Equations (3.25) through (3.29), I examine the belief revisions between the 
intersection of the prior Holder and Non-Holder beliefs and the intersection of the 
posterior Holder and Non-Holder beliefs.  I identify the line that connects these two 
points as the ‘Revision Path’, RP.   The length of RP (PathLength) indicates the 
magnitude of the belief revision.  The relation between market liquidity and the 
magnitude of belief revisions is expected to be positive.  Therefore, I expect the sign of 
the coefficient for the variable PathLength to be positive. 
The slope of RP (Slope) indicates the ratio of the change in Non-Holder beliefs to 
the change in Holder beliefs.  A Slope greater (less) than one indicates that Non-Holders 
are revising their beliefs more (less) than Holders.  As explained previously, this implies 
a convergence (divergence) of beliefs.  A positive Slope indicates that both Holders and 
Non-Holders are revising their beliefs in a homogenous manner (either positively or 
negatively).  A negative Slope indicates that Holders and Non-Holders are revising their 
beliefs in a heterogeneous manner (one positively and one negatively).   However, I 
hypothesize that market liquidity is a function of both the homogeneity of belief revisions 
and the convergence of beliefs.   Therefore, because a positive Slope could indicate either 
a convergence or a divergence of beliefs, the relation between market liquidity and Slope 
is indeterminate.  However, a positive (negative) coefficient on the Slope variable would 




To account for the convergence of beliefs, I test the relation between market 
liquidity and the joint relations between homogeneous belief revisions and the 
convergence of beliefs.  Recalling that the variable DHold indicates a divergence of 
beliefs and DNon indicates a convergence of beliefs, the variables Slope*DHold and 
Slope*DNon indicate consistent/inconsistent divergence and convergence, respectively.  
A positive (negative) Slope*DHold would indicate homogeneous divergence 
(heterogenous divergence).  A positive (negative) Slope*DNon would indicate 
homogeneous convergence (heterogeneous convergence).  I expect a negative coefficient 
for Slope*DHold and a positive coefficient for Slope*DNon. 
Next, I use the belief revisions dataset and estimate the following regression 
models (with the predicted signs of the coefficients given in parentheses) that test the 
relation between volume and the change in the level of consensus: 
 
( ) ( )?
10jt jtAbnormalTO CONTROLjtb Divergea ε
−
= + + +  (3.30) 
 
( ) ( )?
10jt jtAbnormalTO CONTROLjtb Convergea ε
+
= + + +  (3.31) 
 
( ) ( )? ?
1 jt0 Constantjt jtAbnormalTO CONTROLba ε= + + +  (3.32) 
Next, I test the relation between volume and the heterogeneity of investor belief revisions 
by estimating the following regression models (with the predicted signs of the 
coefficients given in parentheses): 
 
 
( ) ( )?
10jt jtAbnormalTO CONTROLjtb Consistenta ε
+




Finally, I test the relation between volume and the phenomena wherein investors revise 
their beliefs such that those with lower pre-event valuations have higher post-event 
valuations and vice versa.  To do so, I estimate the following regression model (with the 




0 1jt jtAbnormalTO a CONTROLjtb Flip ε
+
= + + +  (3.34) 
After examining the relation between volume and each possible characteristic of belief 
revisions individually, I test the relation between volume and each of the 11 possible 
combinations of these characteristics.  To do so, I estimate the following regression 
models (with the predicted signs of the coefficients given in parentheses): 
 





CONTROLjt jt jtb Consistent Converge NoFlipa ε
+
= + + +∗ (3.35) 
 





CONTROLjt jt jtb Consistent Converge Flipa ε
+
= + + +∗  (3.36) 
 





CONTROLjt jt jtb Consistent Diverge NoFlipa ε
−
= + + +∗ (3.37) 
 





CONTROLjt jt jtb Consistent Diverge Flipa ε
+
= + + +∗  (3.38) 
 
( ) ( )? 0
1 jt0 Constant *
jtAbnormalTO









CONTROLjt jt jtb Inconsistent Converge NoFlipa ε
+
= + + +∗ (3.40) 
 





CONTROLjt jt jtb Inconsistent Converge Flipa ε
+
= + + +∗ (3.41) 
 





CONTROLjt jt jtb Inconsistent Diverge NoFlipa ε
−
= + + +∗ (3.42) 
 





CONTROLjt jt jtb Inconsistent Diverge Flipa ε
+
= + + +∗  (3.43) 
 
( ) ( )?




CONTROLjt jtb Inconsistent Flipa ε
+
= + + +∗  (3.44) 
 
 
( ) ( )?




CONTROLjt jtb Consistent Flipa ε
+
= + + +∗  (3.45) 
 
 
Equations (3.30) through (3.45) examine the characteristics of pairs of annual 
analyst forecasts made both before and after a quarterly earnings announcement.  Each 
pair is classified using three qualitative variables.  Consistent indicates that the pair of 
analysts revise their beliefs in the same direction (either both upward or both downward).  
A Consistent pair in the Analyst Pairings dataset is indicative of homogenous belief 
revisions similar to a firm-month in the Holder/Non-Holder dataset with a positive Slope.  
As I mentioned previously, I hypothesize that market liquidity is a function of both the 
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homogeneity of belief revisions and the convergence of beliefs.   Therefore, because a 
Consistent pair could indicate either a convergence or a divergence of beliefs, the relation 
between market liquidity and Consistent is indeterminate.  However, a positive (negative) 
coefficient on the Consistent variable would clearly indicate that the homogeneity of 
belief revisions is positively (inversely) related to market liquidity.   
To account for the convergence of beliefs, I test the relation between market 
liquidity and the joint relations between homogeneous belief revisions and the 
convergence of beliefs.  Diverge indicates that the difference in the two analysts’ post-
announcement forecasts is greater than the difference in their pre-announcement 
forecasts19.  A Diverge pair in the Analyst Pairings dataset is indicative of an increase in 
across-group dispersion (divergence of beliefs) similar to a DHold firm-month in the 
Holder/Non-Holder dataset.  Consistent*Diverge indicates the pair of analysts revise their 
beliefs in the same direction (either both upward or both downward) and the difference in 
the two analysts’ post-announcement forecast is greater than the difference in their-pre-
announcement forecasts.  I expect that the coefficients for both Diverge and 
Consistent*Diverge will be negative indicating an inverse relation between changes in 
market liquidity and the divergence of beliefs regardless of if analysts (investors) revise 
their beliefs in a homogeneous manner. 
Kandel and Pearson (1995) are the first to document an interesting phenomenon 
with respect to belief revisions which they label ‘flips’.  A flip occurs when the analyst 
reporting the higher pre-announcement forecast subsequently reports the lower post-
announcement forecast.  Kandel and Pearson (1995) followed by Bamber, Barron and 
Stober (1999) provide evidence of the existence of flips, divergence and inconsistencies 
                                                 
19This difference in forecasts is measured in actual terms as opposed to absolute terms. 
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in analyst forecasts around quarterly earnings announcements.  These phenomena, and 
additional evidence of a positive relation between these unexpected behaviors and trading 
volume, they argue, refute the notion of homogeneous belief revisions.  In both of these 
studies, the authors aggregate pairs that I label as inconsistent, divergent or a flip into one 
measure.  This measure, KP(1995), is the proportion of all pairs for the same firm that fit 
any of these criteria.  I test inconsistent, divergent and flip pairs separately in order to 
determine the impact of each of these characteristics individually.  Therefore, the third 
qualitative variable with respect to the Analyst Pairings dataset is Flip.  Flip indicates 
that the analyst reporting the higher pre-announcement forecast subsequently reports the 
lower post-announcement forecast.  The relation between changes in market liquidity and 
Flip is expected to be positive. 
I also test the relation of the three possible pairs of these characteristics 
(Consistent*Diverge, Consistent*Flip and Diverge*Flip) on changes in market liquidity.  
Finally, I test the relation between pairs that exhibit all three characteristics 
(Consistent*Diverge*Flip) and changes in market liquidity.  I expect a negative 
coefficient for the variable Consistent*Diverge, but the relations between 
Consistent*Flip, Diverge*Flip and changes in market liquidity are indeterminate. 
3.4.2.4. Hypothesis Four 
 
To test H4 regarding simultaneous changes in both within group dispersion and 
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+ * jCONTROLj jDec DNHDec ε+ +  (3.54) 
I model all possible combinations of simultaneous changes in within-group and 
across-group dispersion.  Recall that DHold indicates an increase in across-group 
dispersion (belief divergence) and DNon indicates a decrease in across-group dispersion 
(belief convergence).  To account for changes in within-group dispersion, DHInc and 
DHDec account for increases and decreases in Holder group dispersion while DNHInc 
and DNHDec account for increases and decreases in Non-Holder group dispersion.  The 
eight interaction variables tested separately in Equations (3.46) through (3.53) and 
together in Equation (3.54) represent all of the possible combinations of across-group and 
within-group dispersion.  I expect that a decrease in across group dispersion is related to 
an increase in market liquidity because of an increase in the overlap between the two 
population distributions.  I expect that an increase in the dispersion within either (or both) 
groups is related to an increase in market liquidity because stretching either (or both) 
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population distributions also increases the overlap between the two populations.  
However, in some cases, it is unclear how simultaneous changes in across group and 
within-group dispersion are related to market liquidity.  For example, if across group 
dispersion increases, market liquidity could either increase or decrease depending upon 
whether or not the individual population distributions stretch enough to cover the added 
distance between the two population means.  Also, if across group dispersion decreases, 
but within-group dispersion also decreases (in one or both of the populations), market 
liquidity could either increase or decrease depending upon if the distributions collapse 
more than enough to overcome the shortened distance between the two population means.  
Therefore, I can only predict the signs of the coefficients of the variables that represent 
the two extreme cases:  DHold*DHDec*DNHDec and DNon*DHInc*DNHInc.  
DNon*DHInc*DNHInc indicates a decrease in across-group dispersion (convergence of 
beliefs) and an increase in the dispersion within both the Holder and the Non-Holder 
groups.  I expect that this case is positively related to market liquidity and therefore 
expect a positive coefficient for this variable.  DHold*DHDec*DNHDec indicates an 
increase in across-group dispersion (divergence of beliefs) and a decrease in the 
dispersion within both the Holder and the Non-Holder groups.  I expect that this case is 
inversely related to market liquidity and therefore expect a negative coefficient for this 
variable.   
3.4.2.5. Hypothesis Five 
 
To test H5 regarding no change in dispersion, I examine the intercepts of 
regression Equations (3.21), (3.23) and (3.24).  Equation (3.21) tests the relation between 
changes in market liquidity and changes in within-group dispersion.  Equations (3.23) 
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and (3.24) test the relation between changes in market liquidity and changes in across-
group dispersion.  The impact of observations that reflect no change in dispersion would 
be captured in the intercept terms of these equations.  Recalling that I remove the impact 
of liquidity traders and ‘portfolio rebalancers’ by using abnormal turnover as my 
dependent variable, I expect that there would be no change in market liquidity in the 
absence of a change in dispersion20.  Therefore, I expect the coefficients of the intercept 
terms in regression Equations (3.21), (3.23) and (3.24) to be insignificantly different from 
zero. 
                                                 
20 See Tkac (1999) for a detailed discussion of the impact of portfolio rebalancing on trading volume. 
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Chapter 4:  Results and Discussion 
 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
 
I use two panel datasets in my analysis.  The first dataset aggregates all analyst forecasts 
made in the same month for the same firm for 4,473 firms over the time period from 1990 to 
2002.  Additionally, it contains two subsets:  ‘holder’ and ‘non-holder’ forecasts which proxy for 
the beliefs of investors who hold or do not hold the traded asset.  This dataset contains 80,470 
firm-month observations.  The second dataset includes mean values of analysts forecasts made 
45 days prior to a firm’s quarterly earnings announcement and revised within 30 days following 
the earnings announcement.  This dataset covers the 40 quarters beginning January 1993 and 
ending December 2002.  This dataset contains 5,640 observations representing forecast revisions 
relative to quarterly earnings announcements for 1,364 firms. 
4.1.1. Holder/Non-holder Dataset 
 
Table XIII reports descriptive statistics for the key quantitative variables in the dataset.  
Median abnormal turnover is less than mean abnormal turnover in the full dataset and both 
subsets indicating a positively skewed distribution.  This distribution indicates that many firms in 
the sample experience low (or even negative) abnormal turnover while a small number of firms 
experience extremely high abnormal turnover.  However, both the mean and median values are 
positive indicating that the sample firms are overtrading the market.  This is especially 





Table XIII:  Holder/Non-Holder Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for all key quantitative variables from the Holder/N on-Holder dataset 
used in regression equations.  AbnormalTOjt is defined as the percentage of outstanding shares traded for firm j in 
month t minus the percentage of outstanding shares traded for all firms in the CRSP database in month t.  
∆AbnormalTOjt is defined as the change in the percentage of outstanding shares traded for firm j in month t minus 
the percentage of outstanding shares traded for all firms in the CRSP database in month t.  Dispjt is defined as the 
coefficient of variation in all forecasts for firm j in month t.  Across is defined as the difference in the mean holder 
forecast and the mean non-holder forecast.  ∆Across is defined as the change in the difference in the mean holder 
forecast and the mean non-holder forecast.  ∆HDispjt is defined as the change in the coefficient of variation in 
forecasts greater than the consensus forecast for firm j in month t.  ∆NHDispjt is defined as the change in the 
coefficient of variation in forecasts less than or equal to the consensus forecast for firm j in month t.  Distance is 
defined as ( ) ( )2 2
H NH







DHold is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the mean price revision of the holder group is greater than that of the 
non-holder group and is zero otherwise.  DNon is a dummy variable that is set to 1, if the mean price revision of the 
non-holder group is greater than that of the holder group and is zero otherwise.   
Panel A:  1990 – 1999 (N = 56,572) 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Dev. 
AbnormalTO -0.1379 109.5102 0.0641 0.0003 0.5129
∆AbnormalTO -7.1551 2.2788 -0.0021 -0.0014 0.1261
Disp 0.0012 NM21 NM 0.0465 NM
Across 0.0100 34.0875 0.2750 0.1300 0.7384
∆Across -33.9195 31.8613 -0.0080 -0.0075 0.6828
∆HDisp NM NM NM -0.0003 NM
∆NHDisp NM NM NM -0.0008 NM
Distance 0.0071 24.3482 0.2007 0.0943 0.5495
PathLength 0.0000 35.4574 0.3553 0.1444 0.9209
Slope NM NM NM 0.7647 NM
DHold*Slope NM NM NM 0.0000 NM
DNon*Slope NM NM NM 0.0000 NM
Panel B:  2000 – 2002 (N = 23,898) 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Dev. 
AbnormalTO -0.1954 49.1659 0.1086 0.0147 0.4821
∆AbnormalTO -32.6467 6.1572 -0.0040 -0.0002 0.3471
Disp 0.0007 NM NM 0.0467 NM
Across 0.0100 63.3333 0.1992 0.0811 0.8073
∆Across -18.7983 19.5983 -0.0094 -0.0070 0.5611
∆HDisp NM NM NM -0.0010 NM
∆NHDisp NM NM NM -0.0015 NM
Distance 0.0071 45.6703 0.1457 0.0589 0.5995
PathLength 0.0000 58.1355 0.3287 0.1324 0.9519
Slope NM NM NM 0.8816 NM
table continued 
                                                 
21 NM (Not Meaningful) indicates a statistic that is unusually high or low.  These values occur in ratios where either 




DHold*Slope NM NM NM 0.0000 NM
DNon*Slope NM NM NM 0.0000 NM
Panel C:  1990 – 2002 (N = 80,470) 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Dev. 
AbnormalTO -0.1954 109.5102 0.0773 0.0029 0.5043
∆AbnormalTO -32.6467 6.1572 -0.0026 -0.0012 0.2150
Disp 0.0007 NM NM 0.0466 NM
Across 0.0100 63.3333 0.2525 0.1150 0.7603
∆Across -33.9195 31.8613 -0.0080 -0.0075 0.6828
∆HDisp NM NM NM -0.0005 NM
∆NHDisp NM NM NM -0.0010 NM
Distance 0.0071 45.6703 0.1844 0.0829 0.5654
PathLength 0.0000 58.1355 0.3476 0.1413 0.9301
Slope NM NM NM 0.8033 NM
DHold*Slope NM NM NM 0.0000 NM
DNon*Slope NM NM NM 0.0000 NM
Table XIV reports frequency data for the key qualitative variables in the dataset.  In all 
samples, the majority of firm-months (42% versus 32-34%) are marked by a convergence of 
beliefs as indicated by the variables DHold and DNon.  Similarly, within-group dispersion also 
appears to be decreasing more often than increasing (63-66% versus 33-36%) as indicated by the 
variables DHInc, DHDec, DNHInc and DNHDec.  This decrease in within-group dispersion is 
evident in both the holder and non-holder groups.  In addition, more observations are marked by 
no change in across-group (approximately 25%) dispersion than no change in within-group 
(approximately 1%) dispersion. 
Table XIV:  Frequency of Holder/Non-Holder Qualitative Variables 
This table reports the percentage of all observations in the Holder/Non-Holder dataset that exhibit the specified 
characteristics.  DHold is a dummy variable that is set to one if the mean price revision of the holder group is greater 
than that of the non-holder group and is zero otherwise.  DNon is a dummy variable that is set to one, if the mean 
price revision of the non-holder group is greater than that of the holder group and is zero otherwise.  DHInc is a 
qualitative variable that is set to one if the coefficient of variation for the holder group increases relative to the prior 
period and is zero otherwise.  DHDec is a qualitative variable that is set to 1 if the coefficient of variation for the 
holder group decreases relative to the prior period and is zero otherwise.  DNHInc is a qualitative variable set to one 
if the coefficient of variation of the non-holder group increases relative to the prior period and is zero otherwise.  
DNHDec is a qualitative variable set to one if the coefficient of variation of the non-holder group decreases relative 





Panel A:  1990 – 1999 (N = 56,572) 



























Panel B:  2000 – 2002 (N = 23,898) 






























Panel C:  1990 – 2002 (N = 80,470) 



























Table XV reports the correlations between the key quantitative variables.
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Table XV:  Correlation Matrix 
This table displays the estimated Pearson correlation coefficients using monthly data with two-tailed probability values given in parentheses.  AbnormalTOjt is defined 
as the percentage of outstanding shares traded for firm j in month t minus the percentage of outstanding shares traded for all firms in the CRSP database in month t.  
∆AbnormalTOjt is defined as the change in the percentage of outstanding shares traded for firm j in month t minus the percentage of outstanding shares traded for all 
firms in the CRSP database in month t.  Dispjt is defined as the coefficient of variation in all forecasts for firm j in month t.  Across is defined as the difference in the 
mean holder forecast and the mean non-holder forecast.  ∆HDispjt is defined as the change in the coefficient of variation in forecasts greater than the consensus forecast 
for firm j in month t.  ∆NHDispjt is defined as the change in the coefficient of variation in forecasts less than or equal to the consensus forecast for firm j in month t.  
Distance is defined as ( ) ( )2 2
H NH






.  DHold is a dummy variable that is set to 
1 if the mean price revision of the holder group is greater than that of the non-holder group and is zero otherwise.  DNon is a dummy variable that is set to 1, if the 
mean price revision of the non-holder group is greater than that of the holder group and is zero otherwise.   
Panel A:  1990 – 1999 
 Abnormal TO 
∆Abnormal 


















          





         







        









       











      













     




































   











































































Panel B:  2000 – 2002 
 Abnormal TO 
∆Abnormal 


















          





         







        









       











      













     




































   







































































Panel C:  1990 – 2002 
 Abnormal TO 
∆Abnormal 



















































































































   







































































The Across, ∆Across, Distance and PathLength variables are all highly correlated with the dependent variables AbnormalTO 
and ∆AbnormalTO.  This gives a preliminary indication that across-group dispersion and the magnitude of belief revisions may have 
some explanatory power with respect to trading volume.  The Distance and PathLength variables are also highly correlated with 
Across and with each other.  The correlation between the variables Across, ∆Across, Slope and DHold*Slope and Slope and 
DNon*Slope is to be expected.  To prevent interpretation errors due to multicollinearity, I do not include combinations of these 
variables in my regression models. 
4.1.2. Belief Revisions Dataset 
 
In the full belief revisions dataset, pre-announcement abnormal turnover ranges from -11.52 % to 216.16% with a mean value 
of 3.09%.  However, after the quarterly earnings announcement, abnormal turnover rises to a range of -10.35 % to 788.04% with a 




The market capitalization of the firms in the sample ranges from $3,094,410 to 
$498,415,940,000 with a mean of $10,030,096,780.  The post-announcement returns relative to 
the quarterly earnings announcement for firms in the sample range from -0.58% to +0.78% with 
a mean of 0.00%. 
In the 1995-1998 subset of the belief revisions dataset, pre-announcement abnormal 
turnover ranges from -6.63 % to 161.34% with a mean value of 2.45%.  However, after the 
quarterly earnings announcement, abnormal turnover rises to a range of -6.14% to 349.83% with 
a mean value of 7.41%.  The market capitalization of the firms in the sample ranges from 
$3,094,410 to $188,596,271,000 with a mean of $8,792,683,380.  The post-announcement 
returns relative to the quarterly earnings announcement for firms in the sample range from -
0.33% to +0.38% with a mean of 0.00%. 
Tables XVI and XVII report frequency data for the key qualitative variables in the 
dataset.  This data exhibits high occurrences of divergence of beliefs (12%/13%), inconsistent 
belief revisions (26%) and ‘flips’ (17%).  Kandel and Pearson (1995) report that on average, 
13.4% of their sample observations exhibit both inconsistent belief revisions and either flip or 
diverge.  Bamber, Barron and Stober (1999) report a slightly lower occurrence rate of 12.4% in 
their full sample.  In the full sample, 7.69% of all observations exhibit inconsistent belief 
revisions and either flip or diverge.  In the 1995-1998 subset, 8.7% of all observations fit this 
criteria. 
 These tables show that the pairs of analysts in the sample tend to agree more after 
the quarterly earnings announcement by revising their forecasts in the same direction.  However, 
the magnitude of these changes tends not to be such that analysts with the lower forecasts before 
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the announcement have higher forecasts after the announcement.  Thus, analysts in this sample 
tend to revise their forecasts in a homogeneous manner. 
Table XVI:  Frequency of Analyst Pairings Qualitative Variables 
This table reports the percentage of all observations in the Analyst Pairings dataset that exhibit the specified 
characteristics.  There are 5,640 total observations in the dataset.  Diverge (Converge) is a qualitative variable set to 
one if the difference in the post-announcement forecasts is greater (less) than the difference in the pre-announcement 
forecasts and is zero otherwise.  Consistent is a qualitative variable set to one if a pair of analysts revise their 
forecast in the same direction and is zero otherwise.  Inconsistent is a qualitative variable set to one if a pair of 
analysts revises their forecast in opposite directions and is zero otherwise.  Flip (NoFlip) is a qualitative variable set 
to one if a pair of analysts revises their forecasts in such a way that the analyst with the higher pre-announcement 
forecast has the lower (higher) post-announcement forecast and is zero otherwise. 
Panel A:  Full Dataset 
Variable Sum Percentage of Total Observations 
Do the Analysts Agree More After the Announcement? 
Converge (Yes) 4,926 87.34
Diverge (No) 677 12.00
Constant (No Change) 37 0.66
Total 5,640 100.00
Do the Analysts Revise in the Same Direction? 
Consistent (Yes) 4,194 74.36
Inconsistent (No) 1,446 25.64
Total 5,640 100.00
Does the Higher Pre-Event Analyst Become the Lower Post-Event Analyst? 
Flip (Yes) 948 16.81
No Flip (No) 4,692 83.19
Total 5,640 100.00
Panel B:  1995 – 1998 Subset 
Variable Sum Percentage of Total Observations 
Do the Analysts Agree More After the Announcement? 
Converge (Yes) 1,596 86.27
Diverge (No) 242 13.08
Constant (No Change) 12 0.65
Total 1,850 100.00
Do the Analysts Revise in the Same Direction? 
Consistent (Yes) 1,371 74.11
Inconsistent (No) 479 25.89
Total 1,850 100.00
Does the Higher Pre-Event Analyst Become the Lower Post-Event Analyst? 
Flip (Yes) 312 16.86






Table XVII:  Frequency of Specific Types of Belief Revisions 
This table reports the percentage of all observations in the Analyst Pairings dataset that exhibit the specified 
characteristics.  There are 5,640 total observations in the dataset.  Diverge (Converge) is a qualitative variable set to 
one if the difference in the post-announcement forecasts is greater (less) than the difference in the pre-announcement 
forecasts and is zero otherwise.  Consistent is a qualitative variable set to one if a pair of analysts revise their 
forecast in the same direction and is zero otherwise.  Inconsistent is a qualitative variable set to one if a pair of 
analysts revises their forecast in opposite directions and is zero otherwise.  Flip (NoFlip) is a qualitative variable set 
to one if a pair of analysts revises their forecasts in such a way that the analyst with the higher pre-announcement 
forecast has the lower (higher) post-announcement forecast and is zero otherwise. 
Panel A:  Full Dataset 
Variable Sum Percentage of Total Observations 
Consistent Convergent 3,056 54.18
Consistent Convergent Flip 525 9.31
Consistent Divergent 524 9.29
Consistent Divergent Flip 53 0.94
Consistent Constant 32 0.57
Consistent Constant Flip 4 0.07
Inconsistent Convergent 1,013 17.96
Inconsistent Convergent Flip 332 5.89
Inconsistent Divergent 67 1.19
Inconsistent Divergent Flip 33 0.59
Inconsistent Constant Flip 1 0.02
Total 5,640 100.00
Panel B:  1995 – 1998 Subset 
Variable Sum Percentage of Total Observations 
Consistent Convergent 1,005 54.32
Consistent Convergent Flip 151 8.16
Consistent Divergent 182 9.84
Consistent Divergent Flip 21 1.14
Consistent Constant 9 0.49
Consistent Constant Flip 3 0.16
Inconsistent Convergent 318 17.19
Inconsistent Convergent Flip 122 6.59
Inconsistent Divergent 24 1.30
Inconsistent Divergent Flip 15 0.81






4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
 
4.2.1. Hypothesis One 
 
Table XVIII reports the average estimates and t-statistics of each coefficient using the 
methodology of Fama and MacBeth (1973) in the three regressions used to test H1.   
Table XVIII:  Relations Between Trading Volume and Overall Dispersion 
This table reports the average estimates of each coefficient in the regression equation with t-statistics given in 
parentheses.  Regressions are performed by fiscal year and by month.  Average coefficients and t-statistics are 
calculated using Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology.  The dependent variable in all models is AbnormalTOjt.  
AbnormalTOjt is defined as the percentage of outstanding shares traded for firm j in month t minus the percentage of 
outstanding shares traded for all firms in the CRSP database in month t.  Dispjt is defined as the coefficient of 
variation in all forecasts for firm j in month t.  Distance is defined as ( ) ( )2 2
H NH
µ µ µ µ− + − .   
Panel A:  1990 – 1999 
Intercept ? 0.4919(3.63)*** 0.4322(4.51)*** 
Disp - 0.3109(0.83)  
Distance - 0.3134(1.51) 
Panel B:  2000 – 2002 
Intercept ? 0.4201(18.28)*** 0.4020(17.64)*** 
Disp - 0.4859(2.81)***  
Distance - 0.4781(1.74)* 
Panel C:  1990 – 2002 
Intercept ? 0.4748(4.59)*** 0.4250(5.81)*** 
Disp - 0.3527(1.22)  
Distance - 0.3527(2.06)** 
 
In all three models and all three sample periods the signs of the coefficients are the 
opposite of what I predict.  This indicates a weak, positive relation between overall dispersion 
and trading volume.  That is, as there is more disagreement among investors, in general, market 
liquidity (as measured here by abnormal turnover) increases. 
4.2.2. Hypothesis Two 
 
Table XIX reports the average estimates and t-statistics of each coefficient using the 




Table XIX:  Relations Between Trading Volume and Within-Group Dispersion  
This table reports the average estimates of each coefficient in the regression equation with t-statistics given in 
parentheses.  Regressions are performed by fiscal year and by month.  Average coefficients and t-statistics are 
calculated using Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology.  The dependent variable in all models is ∆AbnormalTOjt.  
∆AbnormalTOjt is defined as the change in the percentage of outstanding shares traded for firm j in month t minus 
the percentage of outstanding shares traded for all firms in the CRSP database in month t.  ∆HDispjt is defined as the 
change in the coefficient of variation in forecasts greater than the consensus forecast for firm j in month t.  
∆NHDispjt is defined as the change in the coefficient of variation in forecasts less than or equal to the consensus 
forecast for firm j in month t.   
Panel A:  1990 – 1999 
Intercept ? -0.0078(-0.19) -0.2671(-0.95) 
∆HDisp + 0.3743(1.69)*  
∆NHDisp + 0.6833(1.34) 
Panel B:  2000 – 2002 
Intercept ? 0.0606(3.69)*** 0.4139(0.98) 
∆HDisp + 0.4605(1.80)*  
∆NHDisp + 0.9156(2.06)** 
Panel C:  1990 – 2002 
Intercept ? 0.0086(0.27) -0.1037(-0.44) 
∆HDisp + 0.3950(2.20)**  
∆NHDisp + 0.7390(1.84)* 
 
The signs of the coefficients for ∆HDisp and ∆NHDisp are positive in all models and all 
sample periods.  This indicates that a change in the dispersion of either group (holders or non-
holders) is positively related to trading volume.  
4.2.3. Hypothesis Three 
 
Table XX reports the average estimates and t-statistics of each coefficient using the methodology 
of Fama and MacBeth (1973) in the regression equation used to test H3a and H3b.  All right-hand-
side variables are positive in all regression equations.  This indicates that any change in across-
group dispersion is positively related to trading volume.  DHold and DNon appear to have 
greater explanatory power than Across and ∆Across.   
Table XXI reports the average estimates and t-statistics of each coefficient using the 
methodology of Fama and MacBeth (1973) in the regression equations based on the Holder/Non-
Holder dataset used to test H3c and H3d. 
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Table XX:  Relations Between Trading Volume and Across-Group Dispersion  
This table reports the average estimates of each coefficient in the regression equation with t-statistics given in 
parentheses.  Regressions are performed by fiscal year and by month.  Average coefficients and t-statistics are 
calculated using Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology.  The dependent variable in all models is AbnormalTOjt.  
AbnormalTOjt is defined as the percentage of outstanding shares traded for firm j in month t minus the percentage of 
outstanding shares traded for all firms in the CRSP database in month t.  Across is defined as the difference in the 
mean holder forecast and the mean non-holder forecast.  ∆Across is defined as the change in the difference in the 
mean holder forecast and the mean non-holder forecast.  DHold is a dummy variable that is set to one if the mean 
price revision of the holder group is greater than that of the non-holder group and is zero otherwise.  DNon is a 
dummy variable that is set to one, if the mean price revision of the non-holder group is greater than that of the holder 
group and is zero otherwise.   
Panel A:  1990 – 1999 
 Intercept Across ∆Across DHold DNon 
Predicted 
Sign ? - - - + 













Panel B:  2000 – 2002 
 Intercept Across ∆Across DHold DNon 
Predicted 
Sign ? - - - + 













Panel C:  1990 – 2002 
 Intercept Across ∆Across DHold DNon 
Predicted 
Sign ? - - - + 

















Table XXI:  Relations Between Trading Volume and Belief Revision Magnitude  
This table reports the average estimates of each coefficient in the regression equation with t-statistics given in 
parentheses.  Regressions are performed by fiscal year and by month.  Average coefficients and t-statistics are 
calculated using Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology.  The dependent variable in all models is ∆AbnormalTOjt.  
∆AbnormalTOjt is defined as the change in the percentage of outstanding shares traded for firm j in month t minus 
the percentage of outstanding shares traded for all firms in the CRSP database in month t.  PathLength is defined as 






.  DHold is a qualitative variable that is set to one if the mean 
price revision of the holder group is greater than that of the non-holder group and is zero otherwise.  DNon is a 
qualitative variable that is set to one, if the mean price revision of the non-holder group is greater than that of the 
holder group and is zero otherwise.      
Panel A:  1990 – 1999 
 Intercept PathLength Slope Slope*DHold Slope*DNon DHold DNon 
 ? ? ? - + - + 
 0.0221 (0.51) 
  0.1280 
(3.83)*** 
   
 0.0375 (1.98)** 
   0.0860 
(3.95)*** 
  





   
 0.0629 (3.71)*** 
0.0931 
(1.66)* 
  0.1186 
(3.68)*** 
  









Panel B:  2000 – 2002 
 Intercept PathLength Slope Slope*DHold Slope*DNon DHold DNon 
 ? ? ? - + - + 
 0.0355 (1.08) 
  0.1547 
(5.61)*** 
   
 0.0535 (3.61)*** 
   0.0641 
(2.03)** 
  





   
 0.0393 (0.78) 
0.2495 
(0.75) 
  0.0900 
(1.73)* 
  









Panel C:  1990 – 2002 
 Intercept PathLength Slope Slope*DHold Slope*DNon DHold DNon 
 ? ? ? - + - + 
 0.0253 (0.74) 
  0.1344 
(5.13)*** 
   
 0.0413 (2.79)*** 
   0.0807 
(4.44)*** 
  





   
 0.0571 (3.22)*** 
0.1315 
(1.43) 
  0.1116 
(4.06)*** 
  












Again, the coefficients for all right-hand-side variables are positive.  This indicates that any 
change in across-group dispersion is positively related to trading volume.  PathLength, which 
measures, the magnitude of the belief revision, appears to have little explanatory power.  Slope, 
which measures both the consistency of the belief revision and the relative magnitude of the 
belief revisions across groups, appears to have a high level of explanatory power.  The positive, 
significant coefficients in all regression equations indicate that the consistency of belief revisions 
is positively related to trading volume.  When combined with DHold and DNon, Slope indicates 
whether consistent belief revisions marked by divergence or convergence are related to trading 
volume.  The positive, significant coefficients for the variables DHold*Slope and DNon*Slope in 
all regression equations indicate that regardless of the change in across-group dispersion, 
consistency of belief revisions is positively related to trading volume. 
Table XXII reports the average estimates and t-statistics of each coefficient in the 
regression equations based on the Analyst Pairings dataset used to test H3c and H3d. 
Certain characteristics of belief revisions tend to explain changes in market liquidity.  
When investors revise their beliefs in the same manner (either both upward or both downward) 
resulting in increased consensus, market liquidity tends to increase when measured as the change 
in abnormal turnover or depth.  In these models, Consistent*Convergent is positive and 
significant.  However, when trade-weighted or quoted spreads are used as measures of liquidity, 
spreads tend to widen in response to these characteristics indicating a less liquid market for the 
security.  In these models, Consistent*Convergent is also positive and significant. 
Flips, as previously described, are indicative of a dramatic change in beliefs whereby 





Table XXII:  Relations Between Trading Volume and Belief Revision Characteristics  
This table reports the average estimates of each coefficient in the regression equation with t-statistics given in parentheses based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  
Regressions are performed by fiscal year and quarter.  Average coefficients and t-statistics are calculated using Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology.  Diverge (Converge) 
is a qualitative variable set to one if the difference in the post-announcement forecasts is greater (less) than the difference in the pre-announcement forecasts and is zero 
otherwise.  Consistent is a qualitative variable set to one if a pair of analysts revise their forecast in the same direction and is zero otherwise.  Inconsistent is a qualitative 
variable set to one if a pair of analysts revises their forecast in opposite directions and is zero otherwise.  Flip (NoFlip) is a qualitative variable set to one if a pair of analysts 
revises their forecasts in such a way that the analyst with the higher pre-announcement forecast has the lower (higher) post-announcement forecast and is zero otherwise.  
PriceChange is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the difference between the stock price on the day following the quarterly earnings announcement and the stock 
price on the day prior to the quarterly earnings announcement.  Surprise is the difference between the mean pre-announcement forecast and the actual earnings.  Size is the 
natural logarithm of average market capitalization over the period (-1,+1) relative to the quarterly earnings announcement. 
Panel A:  Dependent Variable is Abnormal Turnover 
























































  1.1025 
(1.59) 








   6.0187 
(2.63)*** 








    1.8943 
(0.87) 








     -0.1972 
(-0.39) 








      2.2872 
(2.24)** 
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(1.34) 
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(1.42) 





















































  0.4213 
(0.06) 








   -6.2430 
(-0.65) 








    13.7551 
(1.32) 








     1.4376 
(0.25) 








      4.3322 
(0.54) 








       8.9206 
(0.37) 








        5.7279 
(0.57) 







































  3.5766 
(1.10) 








   -47.1188 
(-1.56) 








    2.6967 
(0.72) 








     -0.0284 
(-0.01) 
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(1.12) 
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(1.30) 
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(0.62) 










































  25.7776 
(0.79) 








   -635.466 
(-1.71)* 








    12.9666 
(0.37) 








     5.3773 
(0.27) 








      18.1163 
(0.56) 








       59.3323 
(0.94) 
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(0.51) 







































  759.909 
(1.07) 








   5494.52 
(1.82)* 








    152.424 
(0.10) 








     -227.208 
(-0.40) 








      2197.73 
(2.27)** 








       -483.528 
(-0.27) 
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(0.29) 












































  0.8567 
(0.75) 








   11.9042 
(2.27)** 








    2.7525 
(1.35) 








     1.7074 
(1.91)* 








      3.2557 
(1.76)* 








       1.3312 
(0.70) 








        -2.2315 
(-0.62) 


















In order for investors to rebalance their portfolios to reflect these changes in beliefs, a significant amount of trading must 
occur.  This argument is reflected in the positive and significant regression coefficients for the variables Consistent*Convergent*Flip, 
Consistent*Divergent*Flip and Inconsistent*Convergent*Flip when abnormal turnover and average trade size are used as measures of 
liquidity. 
Finally, as predicted, the control variables PriceChange, Surprise and Size do explain a significant portion of the change in 
liquidity in most models but most notably in those using abnormal turnover as a measure of liquidity.  Specifically, the change in 
price, which Bamber and Cheon (1995) argue indicates the aggregate belief revision, is positive and significant.  This indicates that 
the change in liquidity increases as price change increases.  The change in liquidity also increases as the degree of surprise in the 
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earnings announcement increases.  Thus, as earnings differ more from what investors expect, investors must engage in more trading to 
rebalance their portfolios in response to this new information.  Finally, I use size as a proxy for information asymmetry.  That is, 
larger firms are expected to have less information asymmetry because there is more public information available to investors regarding 
these firms.  As predicted, the change in liquidity decreases as size increases.  Liquidity changes less in large firms than small firms 
because the marginal impact of an individual piece of information is less than in a small firm. 
 
4.2.4. Hypothesis Four 
 
Table XXIII reports the average estimates and t-statistics of each coefficient using the methodology of Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) in the regression equations based on the Holder/Non-Holder dataset used to test H4. 
Previously presented results showed a positive relation between volume and any independent change in across-group and within-group 
dispersion.  Here, simultaneous changes in dispersion both within and across groups (holders and non-holders) are examined.  All 
coefficients are positive and significant.  These results indicate that any simultaneous change in across-group and within-group 






Table XXIII:  Relations Between Trading Volume and Simultaneous Changes in Within-Group and Across-Group Dispersion 
This table reports the average estimates of each coefficient in the regression equation with t-statistics given in parentheses.  Regressions are performed by fiscal 
year and by month.  Average coefficients and t-statistics are calculated using Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology.  The dependent variable in all models is 
∆AbnormalTOjt.  ∆AbnormalTOjt is defined as the change in the percentage of outstanding shares traded for firm j in month t minus the percentage of outstanding 
shares traded for all firms in the CRSP database in month t.  DHold is a dummy variable that is set to one if the mean price revision of the holder group is greater 
than that of the non-holder group and is zero otherwise.  DNon is a dummy variable that is set to one, if the mean price revision of the non-holder group is greater 
than that of the holder group and is zero otherwise.  DHInc is a qualitative variable that is set to one if the coefficient of variation for the holder group increases 
relative to the prior period and is zero otherwise.  DHDec is a qualitative variable that is set to 1 if the coefficient of variation for the holder group decreases 
relative to the prior period and is zero otherwise.  DNHInc is a qualitative variable set to one if the coefficient of variation of the non-holder group increases 
relative to the prior period and is zero otherwise.  DNHDec is a qualitative variable set to one if the coefficient of variation of the non-holder group decreases 
relative to the prior period and is zero otherwise. 
Panel A:  1990 – 1999 

















DHold*DHInc*DNHInc ? 0.1520 (8.68)*** 
       0.1398 
(5.30)*** 
DHold*DHInc*DNHDec ?  0.0545 (2.30)** 
      0.1162 
(3.99)*** 
DHold*DHDec*DNHInc ?   0.0771 (5.34)*** 
     0.1105 
(4.54)*** 
DHold*DHDec*DNHDec -    0.0409 (2.11)** 
    0.0436 
(0.87) 
DNon*DHInc*DNHInc +     0.0749 (7.99)*** 
   0.0795 
(4.05)*** 
DNon*DHInc*DNHDec ?      0.0487 (4.44)*** 
  0.0533 
(3.48)*** 
DNon*DHDec*DNHInc ?       0.0730 (3.30)*** 
 0.0779 
(4.44)*** 
DNon*DHDec*DNHDec ?        0.0546 (5.42)*** 
0.0530 
(6.34)*** 
Panel B:  2000 - 2002 

















DHold*DHInc*DNHInc ? 0.1741 (9.00)*** 
       0.0481 
(0.45) 
DHold*DHInc*DNHDec ?  0.1196 (7.13)*** 






DHold*DHDec*DNHInc ?   0.0699 (3.03)*** 
     0.2457 
(1.54) 
DHold*DHDec*DNHDec -    0.0707 (3.46)*** 
    0.2000 
(1.38) 
DNon*DHInc*DNHInc +     0.0585 (2.11)** 
   0.0221 
(0.39) 
DNon*DHInc*DNHDec ?      0.0754 (3.68)*** 
  0.2470 
(1.57) 
DNon*DHDec*DNHInc ?       0.0637 (2.88)*** 
 -0.0273 
(-0.26) 
DNon*DHDec*DNHDec ?        0.0249 (1.21) 
0.0260 
(0.93) 
Panel C:  1990 – 2002 

















DHold*DHInc*DNHInc ? 0.1573 (11.14)*** 
       0.1175 
(3.60)*** 
DHold*DHInc*DNHDec ?  0.0701 (3.79)*** 
      0.1512 
(3.74)*** 
DHold*DHDec*DNHInc ?   0.0754 (6.13)*** 
     0.1433 
(3.35)*** 
DHold*DHDec*DNHDec -    0.0482 (3.10)*** 
    0.0823 
(1.59) 
DNon*DHInc*DNHInc +     0.0710 (7.32)*** 
   0.0656 
(3.23)*** 
DNon*DHInc*DNHDec ?      0.0552 (5.70)*** 
  0.1010 
(2.50)** 
DNon*DHDec*DNHInc ?       0.0707 (4.04)*** 
 0.0516 
(1.74)* 





4.2.5. Hypothesis Five 
 
For completeness, H5 predicts that if there is no change in dispersion, there will be no 
change in trading volume.  To test this hypothesis, I examine the intercepts of the models that 
isolate the variables ∆HDisp, ∆NHDisp, ∆Across, DHold and DNon where ∆HDisp and 
∆NHDisp examine within group dispersion while ∆Across, DHold and DNon examine across 
group dispersion.  The impact of observations that reflect no change in dispersion are captured in 
the intercept terms of these equations.  In all but one model that analyzes within-group 
dispersion, the intercept term is not significantly different from zero.  This indicates that the 
change in trading volume is primarily explained by changes in within group-dispersion and not 
by firm-months where there is no change in within-group dispersion.  The intercept in the 
equations that use ∆Across to measure across-group dispersion is significantly different from 
zero in all samples.  However, the variable I use to measure changes in across-group dispersion, 
∆Across, does not appear to explain the variation in changes in trading volume.  When I use 
DHold and DNon to measure changes in across-group dispersion, the intercept is not 
significantly different from zero.  This indicates that the change in trading volume is primarily 
explained by changes in across-group dispersion and not by firm-months where there is no 
change in across-group dispersion. 
 
 128
Chapter 5:  Summary and Conclusions 
 
5.1.  Summary 
 
 I use two datasets to test the relation between market liquidity, the heterogeneity of 
beliefs and the heterogeneity of belief revisions.  The first dataset allows me to construct two 
groups that proxy for ‘holders’ and ‘non-holders’ of a traded asset.  This construct allows me to 
test the relation between changes in trading volume (as a measure of market liquidity) and 
changes in the dispersion of beliefs both within and across these two groups.  I examine changes 
in within- and across-group dispersion separately and simultaneously.  The second dataset allows 
me to examine belief revisions more closely by analyzing only those prior and posterior beliefs 
surrounding an information event.  I examine the impact of specific belief revision phenomena 
on trading volume.  I find that a change in dispersion within either group (holders or non-
holders) is positively related to market liquidity.  However, contrary to my expectations, I find 
that any change in across-group dispersion is also positively related to market liquidity.  That is, 
regardless of which group (holders or non-holders) revises more (or the specific characteristics 
of their belief revisions), any change in beliefs prompting a change in belief dispersion is 
positively related to market liquidity.  Also, when within-group and across-group dispersion 
change simultaneously – regardless of the direction or magnitude of the change, market liquidity 
increases.  It is possible that in the aggregate, market participants change their beliefs in an 
offsetting manner.  That is, the aggregate dispersion (either within a particular group or across 
the two groups) prior to and following a news announcement may be quantitatively equal.  I find 
that my results are not driven by these instances.  Finally, I find that the characteristics of market 
participants’ belief revisions relative to one another (consistent or inconsistent, convergent or 
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divergent, etc.) provide little additional insight into changes in market liquidity relative to belief 
revisions surrounding news announcements.  One exception, however, is the case of ‘flips’.  In 
this case, belief revisions across groups are so extreme that essentially holders and non-holders 
change positions such that sellers become buyers and buyers become sellers.  In this extreme 
case, market liquidity is positively impacted. 
5.2.  Conclusion and Future Extensions 
 
 My results provide evidence that without regard to specific information events, trading 
volume is positively related to any change in within-group or across-group dispersion whether 
this dispersion is measured separately or simultaneously.  Second, I provide evidence that 
suggests that both the convergence and homogeneity of belief revisions are positively related to 
changes in trading volume.  Finally, my results suggest that belief revisions such that investors 
with higher valuations subsequently hold lower valuations (‘flips’) have a significant (positive) 
relation to changes in trading volume. 
 These results warrant further examination of the relation between belief revisions and 
market liquidity.  My findings are based on the careful examination of changes in the means of 
distributions of buyer and seller demand prices.  For much of this analysis, however, I have 
assumed little or no change in the variance of these distributions.  However, many interesting 
empirical questions remain.  For example, if changes in market liquidity are, indeed, influenced 
by changes in the overlap in buyer and seller demand price distributions, in what other ways can 
this overlap change shape besides a change in the means of the distributions?  For computational 
ease, I assume normal distributions, but certainly buyer and seller prices can be represented in 
other ways.  In fact, these distributions could shift so dramatically that they ‘lose’ there 
normality after certain extreme changes in one or both distributions.  Particularly, close 
 
 130
examination of those observations in the tails of the distributions is in order.  What would be the 
impact on market liquidity of ‘holdout’ investors whose demand prices are represented in the 
(upper or lower) tails of the distribution?  Consider, for example, sellers who harbor a strong 
desire to liquidate their position in an asset despite general market exuberance with regard to the 
asset that tends to drive the mean price upwards.  These ‘holdouts’ could effect a shift in the 
shape of the distribution such that it could exhibit leptokurtosis due to the ‘fatness’ of the tails of 
the distribution.  Also, a certain degree of negative skewness could also result if these ‘holdouts’ 
occur only in the left tail of the distribution (due to their low demand prices) and are not present 
in the right tail of the distribution.  Thus, a review of the higher moments of the demand price 
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